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Preface 
Since I started to study the early national period in Mexico, from independence 
in 1821 to the fall of General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna's last government 
in 1855, what has become obvious to me is the absence of a clear ideologically-
based interpretation for this period. To quote David Brading (The Origins of 
Mexican Nationalism, (Cambridge, 1985), p.70), this period 'awaits a historian 
capable of tracing the intersection of ideology and constituency and able to 
delineate the full range of its complexities and contradictions'. It has been this 
need, to understand the thinking behind all of the movements, actions and 
conflicts which gave this period its much exaggerated fame for being an era of 
instability or even an 'age of chaos', which has led me to focus on the 
ideological discourse and behaviour of some of its politicians and institutions. 
This study does not aim to provide an ideological understanding of the 
events which shook Mexico for three decades following the achievement of 
independence. Such a study would require a far more extensive analysis. Its 
main objective is, however, to focus on the political identity of one the most 
influential institutions of the period, thus providing a new insight into the more 
general overview of Mexican political thought in its early national period. It is 
evident from the title that this study does not even seek to interpret the ideology 
of the entire regular army. Its parameters are far more limited: it is essentially 
concerned with the beliefs and the behaviour of the military elite, especially the 
beliefs and the behaviour of those high-ranking officers who served as Ministers 
of War between 1822 and 1852. As a result, the conclusions which are reached 
must not be taken to be necessarily representative of the regular army at large. 
They strictly refer to those individuals, who, belonging to a privileged minority 
within the army, developed throughout these years a series of political beliefs, 
which can be perceived to have been shared by most of them. However, 
although the main focus of this study is clearly limited, by concentrating on the 
views of the Mexican army's decision-makers, it does provide a more general 
interpretation of what the political orientation of the army was - even if the 
army was characterised by its largely heterogeneous nature, highlighting what 
the army's jefes were seeking to achieve. 
In a move away from recent trends in the historiography which have tended 
to argue that the regular army either had no ideology or contained as many 
ideologies as there were in society at large, this study shows that amongst the 
members of the military elite, specifically amongst those high-ranking officers 
who acted as Ministers of War during this period, there was a common political 
agenda; and that this political agenda, whilst retaining what could, in very 
general terms, be deemed to be a conservative/traditionalist view of society with 
a strong corporate interest, was, above all, of a deeply reformist character. Such 
a thesis is defined in four separate, yet interrelated, focal-points of analysis. 
Thus, this study consists of an analysis of the existing historiography on the 
political role of the army; an analysis of those issues which prove that the 
predominant views remain unsatisfactory and misleading; an analysis of the 
reforms which were proposed by the Ministers of War, namely, those which 
were advocated by General Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil; and, finally, a 
concluding analysis of the views which were generally upheld by most of the 
Ministers of War. I hope to demonstrate that the military elite did uphold, as a 
class, institution or caste, a strong common sense of political identity, and that 
this, in turn, was of a committed reformist nature, so that future studies in 
political history of the Mexican early national period will cease to view the 
military either as an unpredictable force of chaos or as a purely cynical and 
individualistic institution drenched in rampant predatory praetorianism. 
Military Political Identity and Reformism in 
Independent Mexico: An Analysis of the Memorias 
De Guerra (1821-1855) 
The Importance of the Military in Independent Mexico: Four 
Interpretations of Military Political Behaviour 
The importance of the military in the political life of Mexico following the end 
of the War of Independence in 1821 cannot be stressed enough. In the period 
which has come to be known as the 'age of Santa Anna', and which can be seen 
to cover the years 1821 to 1855, twenty-five individuals served at one point or 
another as president of the Republic. Of these twenty-five only seven were 
civilians. Moreover, four of these seven were only President for a matter of days 
or, at most, a couple of weeks.1 
It is, therefore, a truism to say that following independence Mexico was 
governed (or misgoverned) by a number of high-ranking officers who had 
emerged in the eleven-year war against Spain (1810-1821). Regardless of 
whether they had fought for or against independence prior to the Plan of Iguala, 
the military became the arbitrators of Mexico's destiny. To use Edwin 
Lieuwen's words, 'the collapse of Spanish authority (...) ushered in an era of 
predatory militarism'.2 
Eighteen different generals rose to power in thirty-four years, with 
individuals such as General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna becoming president 
on eleven separate occasions. The main events of the period such as the uprising 
of La Acordada in 1828, the revolt of Jalapa in 1829, that of Veracruz in 1832, 
the Triangular revolt of 1841 or General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga's uprising 
of 1845, to name only a few, were led and fought out by the military and the 
military were the main players. Walter Little estimates that Mexico witnessed 
sixteen successful golpes de estado during these years, having the highest rate 
of military intervention in politics in the whole of the Latin American continent 
after Peru (coming second by only one coup).3 
Jose Maria Bocanegra (18-23 December 1829), Pedro Velez (23-31 December 
1829), Valentin Gomez Farias (30 March - 16 May 1833; 3 - 1 8 June 1833; 5 July - 27 
October 1833; 16 December 1833 - 24 April 1834; 23 December 1846 -21 March 1847), 
Jose Justo Corro (27 February 1836 - 19 April 1837), Javier Echeverria (22 September -
10 October 1841), Manuel de la Pena y Pena (26 September - 13 November 1847; 8 
January - 3 June 1848) and Juan Bautista Ceballos (6 January - 8 February 1853). 
2 Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1961), p. 17. 
3 Walter Little, Military Power in Latin America:An Overview (Liverpool, 1986), 
p. 3. These figures serve to indicate the extent to which the military intervened in 
Mexico in comparison to the rest of Latin America. Evidently, the reasons for these 
However, although the involvement of the military in the politics of the 
period was dominant and overpowering,4 scant attention has actually been given 
to the political nature or even the ideology of the army at the time.5 The 
interpretations that exist tend to support what can be synthesised into four 
different, although not altogether opposed, views about the political resolve of 
the army, and three of these are based on the belief that the army, like Santa 
Anna, did not have any real political ideology. For the sake of definition, these 
four interpretations can be conveyed with the following headings: (1) the rise of 
predatory praetorianism; (2) the conditions of the military: the need for regular 
pay and secure employment as the cause for intervention; (3) the army at the 
service of the politicians, and (4) the army as a reflection of the beliefs upheld 
in society. 
The Rise of Predatory Praetorianism 
The classical (and perhaps still the most popular) view6 is that the military had 
no ideology and that the different caudillos or officers merely intervened to 
further their careers.7 The sudden absence of a King, to whom the military had 
traditionally given their absolute loyalty,8 which came about as a result of the 
interventions not only differed from one another within Mexico during this period, as 
will be seen further on, but there were also different political and historical backgrounds 
to the uprisings in comparison to Peru. It is not the intention of this study to compare the 
different political contexts of Mexico and Peru in terms of, for example, whether more 
golpes were led by Royalist officers than revolutionary chieftains, or whether the 
military intervened to a lesser or greater extent as an autonomous entity in one country 
or another. Although such a comparison certainly merits an article in its own right, the 
use of Little's figures in this study simply illustrates the extent to which the military 
played a fundamental role in the politics of independent Mexico. 
4 It must not be forgotten that a very high percentage of high ranking officers were 
actively involved in the politics of the period, working as deputies, senators, ministers, 
etc. Moreover, the existence of the comandancias generates and the power which was 
vested in them also meant that the army had a very significant influence over the civilian 
prefects at a provincial and local level. 
5 The notable exception is Frank N Samponaro, 'The Political Role of the Army 
in Mexico', unpubl PhD Diss, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1974. 
6 See Jose Maria Luis Mora, Mexico ysus revoluciones (Mexico, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 
92, 120, 351-77, and by the same author, Obras Sueltas (Mexico, 1963 ), pp. 71-72, 
549-56. 
7 Lieuwen, for instance, argues that 'undisciplined, ambitious local chieftains vied 
for supreme power', with politics becoming subjected to 'the whims of army-officer 
politicians who ruled by the sword, perverted justice, and pillaged the treasury', 
Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 17. 
8 According to Archer 'although several units went over to the rebel side (at the 
beginning of the war of independence), the great majority of the regular and provincial 
forces remained loyal'. Christon Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760-1810 
(Albuquerque, 1977), p. 299. For an account, albeit a revisionist one, of a highly 
French occupation of Spain in 1808, accelerated the process by which the army 
became increasingly insubordinate to the interim authorities. The state of 
emergency created by the war of independence further granted the different 
comandantes generales greater political power. By the time General Agustin de 
Iturbide proclaimed the Plan of Iguala (24 February 1821) which brought the 
war to an end, the army commanders were not willing to relinquish their power. 
Moreover, the moment Iturbide became Emperor Agustin I, on 21 May 1822, 
preventing a European monarch from having access to the Mexican throne as 
had been stipulated in Iguala and later in the Treaties of Cordoba (24 August 
1821), he set the precedent by which anybody, as long as they could secure all 
forms of promotions to the troops, could, through the means of a 
pronunciamiento9 or a coup, rise to power. What emerged as a result was a 
military class made up of ambitious officers who believed that if they conspired 
well enough and established the right kind of contacts and allegiances, they 
could one day become president themselves. As the last viceroy of Peru, 
General Joaquin de la Pezuela, faced by the same lust for power among the 
officers who overthrew him, lamented: 
Having become accustomed in Spain to revolutions and to overthrowing 
their leaders and to disobeying the King (...) they were responsible for 
all kinds of upheavals. Turmoil and ungodliness together with 
insubordination were even more prominent among the leaders than 
among the soldiers. Each one of them believed that he was capable of 
ruling an army and even a kingdom.10 
The classical view that independent Mexico was dominated by predatory 
praetorianism develops this notion that the military were an untamed, 
irresponsible, self-motivated and unpredictable force, by further arguing that the 
different generals, colonels and officers used civilian politics to serve their own 
ends. Although John Johnson's interpretation could be deemed simplistic and 
dated, it illustrates the essential beliefs of the classical view very clearly: 
Battles transformed leaders into heroes, heroes into politicians, and 
fighting forces into political parties. The land was infested with men of 
politically motivated Royalist Officer who became the effective ruler of Jalisco for a 
decade (1810-1821), see the depiction of Brigadier Jose de la Cruz's activities in Nueva 
Galicia in Archer, 'Politicization of the army of New Spain during the War of 
Independence, 1810-1821' , in J.E. Rodriguez 0 . (ed.), The Evolution of the Mexican 
Political System (Wilmington, 1993). 
9 For a clear definition of what a pronunciamiento consisted of, what it entailed 
and what it generally had as its main purpose, see Stanley G. Payne, Ejercito y sociedad 
en la Espana liberal, 1808-1936 (Madrid, 1977), pp. 27-28 
10 Quoted in Marques de Rozalejo, El Conde de Cheste (Madrid, 1935), pp. 24-25. 
predatory egotism who sought public office for concrete and personal 
gain. Once in office they did not have to test their avowed political 
beliefs, because public opinion did not exist and power, not doctrine, 
was decisive.11 
It is within this school of thought that the figure of Antonio Lopez de Santa 
Anna appears as the archetypal predatory praetorian. As John Lynch argues, 
'Santa Anna did not have a policy or a political party to express it. So he 
allowed the politicians their space and waited for the next step'.12 Furthermore, 
'he did not subscribe to any ideology, conservative, liberal, federal or radical 
(...). He moved with the times and according to circumstances, to obtain the 
advantages which this gave him'.13 Santa Anna, like the other generals used the 
different parties, changed sides indiscriminately, and upheld no political values 
of notable consistence in order to rise to power. In the succinct and expressive 
words of Enrique Krauze, 'the old military class had done whatever it had 
pleased with the country since 1821'.14 
Pay and Employment Conditions 
Following on from this interpretation of the military, there is the view favoured 
by economists that the military, devoid of any political beliefs, rebelled time 
and again in the hope of obtaining regular pay and secure employment.15 In 
other words the rank and file followed their leaders and joined any revolt which 
might improve their condition with a chance of regular pay, promotion, and 
even some clothes to wear. As the popular saying of the period proclaimed, 
'when salaries are paid, revolutions fade'.16 A perfect example of this is the way 
John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, 1964), p. 
38. Timothy Anna argues that scholarship has failed to understand the period precisely 
because it has been subjected to this classical view which he defineds as the 'chaos 
school', the 'disintegration school', and the 'caudillo school'. T.E. Anna, 'Demystifying 
Early Nineteenth Century Mexico', Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos vol. 9, no. 1 
(Winter, 1993). 
12 John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-1850 (Oxford, 1992), p. 321. 
13 Ibid., p. 334. 
14 Enrique Krauze, Siglo de Caudillos: Biografia Politica de Mexico, 1810-1910 
(Barcelona, 1994), p. 230. 
15 E. Christiansen illustrates very convincingly how reductions in troop numbers, 
redundancy and the difficulties that the different administrations had in actually paying 
and feeding the army in Spain, between 1800 and 1854, all played significant roles in 
turning the army into a praetorian interventionist force. See Christiansen, The Origins of 
Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854 (Oxford, 1967). 
16 See Donald Fithian Stevens, Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico 
(Durham and London, 1991), p. 10. The original line goes as follows, 'cuando los 
sueldos se pagan, las revoluciones se apagan'. 
the army turned against Iturbide in 1823. General Jose Maria Tornel,17 Santa 
Anna's loyal friend throughout the period, Minister of War on six separate 
occasions, and someone who was perfectly aware of the importance of pleasing 
the troops each time Santa Anna rose to power, Tornel believed that 'the Empire 
fell because the immortal Iturbide was unable to pay the wages of the soldiers 
he had just led to victory'.18 As a popular song of the period stated: 
I am a soldier of Iturbide, 
I wear the Three Guarantees, 
I patrol barefoot 
And I fast everyday.19 
Even Joel Poinsett, who was to become the American Minister 
Plenipotentiary in 1825, jotted down prophetically in his notes, after meeting 
Iturbide on a previous visit to Mexico, that as long as the Emperor could afford 
to pay and reward the military he would survive, but that the moment he ran out 
of money they would overthrow him.20 
The theory that the financial condition of the army determined whether they 
intervened against the government or remained loyal to the administration in 
office, regardless of political belief or ideology, is certainly well documented. 
In contrast, an example of how the regular army defended the government at a 
time of economic expansion can be seen in 1832. As the then Minister of War, 
General Jose Antonio Facio stated in his Annual Ministerial Report: 
(the) corps in general were nothing more (...) than a few cadres of 
armed people, with no discipline, no subordination, no morality, and 
many of them did not even have clothes, weapons or horses; however, 
in the last year the different corps have striven to increase their force as 
much as possible; those belonging to the cavalry have horses, and these 
together with those belonging to the infantry are, in their majority, 
brilliantly dressed, armed and equipped with all that is necessary; both 
their instruction and their discipline have made considerable progress; 
17 For more on Tornel see Will Fowler, 'Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil, Mexican 
General/Politician (1794-1853)', Unpubl. PhD Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1994. 
Carmen Vazquez Mantecon has also written a bibiographical study of Tornel which is 
due out in 1997, and is to be published by UNAM. 
18 Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil, Manifestation presentada a la camara de 
senadores por el General Tornel, Apoderado de las diputaciones de cosecheros de 
tabaco de las ciudades de Orizava y Jalapa (Mexico, 1841), p. 6. 
19 Krauze, Siglo de Caudillos, p. 111. In the original: 'Soy soldado de 
Iturbide,/visto las tres garantias,/ hago las guardias descalzo/ y ayuno todos los dias'. 
20 Md. 
in each corps there is a conscious effort to ensure that there is 
subordination and that the ordinances and the current laws are strictly 
abided by; they are taught morality, love to the service, valour and 
patriotism.21 
As Barbara Tenenbaum points out, under the Presidency of General 
Anastasio Bustamante (1830-1832), '$10,450,251 were spent on the army 
alone, the largest sum registered in the history of the Republic until then'.22 
Evidence that Facio, under the Bustamante-Alaman administration of 1830-32, 
succeeded in satisfying the needs of the troops is that they remained loyal to the 
government against Santa Anna's impulso de Veracruz. In fact, in the summer 
of 1832, Santa Anna had to overthrow General Anastasio Bustamante with the 
sole help of the civic militias.23 The dialectic which was established between the 
political roles of the regular army and the civic militias will be looked at further 
on. 
To quote Carmen Vazquez Mantecon, 'the duration of the governments 
depended on the loyalty of the military, and this in turn depended on a regular 
pay and the concession of multiple privileges'.24 A French general, on seeing 
that the Spanish regular army gave assistance to the French authorities against 
the Spanish people during the famous Madrid rising of 2 May , stated 'Toutes 
les troupes espagnoles se reunissent a ceux qui les payent'.25 According to this 
interpretation this was certainly applicable to Mexico. 
The Army at the Service of the Politicians 
An interpretation which is far more subtle than that of the rise of predatory 
praetorianism, and which avoids the simplistic generalisation which is implicit 
in the belief that the military's motivations were exclusively those of attaining 
power, whatever the cost, is the one which has as its premise the belief that it 
was in fact civilian politicians who invited the intervention of the armed forces. 
This view does not necessarily grant the army any significant ideological 
presence. Neither does it deny that the main motivation of the generals who 
were persuaded to side with one cause or another was, in essence, that of 
seeking power for its own sake. However, it does uphold an altogether different 
Jose Antonio Facio, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la 
Guerra, presentada a las camaras el dia 24 de enero de 1831 (Mexico, 1831), p. 5. 
22 Barbara A. Tenenbaum, Mexico en la epoca de los agiotistas, 1821-1857 
(Mexico, 1985), p. 60. 
23 See Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, 'Iglesia, Ejercito y Centralismo', Historia 
Mexicana, vol. xxxix, no.l (Mexico, 1989). 
24 Carmen Vazquez Mantecon, Santa Anna y la encrucijada del Estado: La 
dictadura (1853-1855) (Mexico, 1986), p. 25. 
25 Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power, p. 11. 
perspective by stressing that the cause of military intervention was not military 
ambition but that it was, on the contrary, the consequence of the actual nature of 
the political beliefs and strategies which were adopted by the main factions, 
cliques or parties of the period. In other words, the army was used, for example, 
either by traditionalist civilians such as Lucas Alaman, as was the case with 
General Bustamante in 1830, or by liberal civilians such as Valentin Gomez 
Farias, as was the case with General Santa Anna in 1846, in their own political 
struggle to acquire or retain power. In the words of Brian Hamnett: 
In Mexico, perhaps more so than in other Latin American countries, the 
repeated military interventions happened in a context in which the 
political issues were defined by civilians (...) The intervention of 
military politicians was not motivated to promote the objectives of the 
army, it was determined by the nature of the constitutional conflict 
which existed between the civilians.26 
Needless to say, this interpretation has arisen in recent years as research has 
gradually shown that the political beliefs and movements of the period were 
important in determining the conduct of the different governments and 
politicians of the period. According to Donald Stevens: 
The apolitical caudillo has played a useful role in cutting through the 
complexity of political conflict of this period (...) But the caudillo 
model of the relationship between the economy and political conflict is 
not consistent with available historical data (....) The time has come to 
move beyond the myth (...) Instability requires an explanation that takes 
political differences seriously.27 
The fact that the politics of the period have started to be taken seriously has 
had a major impact on the simplistic view that the early national period was one 
of 'chaos' or of brutal military domination. The two traditional views that the 
first three decades of independent life were either 'an age of caudillos' or even 
the 'age of Santa Anna' have been thoroughly revised through major research in 
the politics of the period. The work of Costeloe has been fundamental in 
providing an interpretation of these years which is not inexorably tied to the 
notion that the figure of Santa Anna was the be all and end all of Mexico's 
Brian Hamnett, 'Partidos polfticos mexicanos e intervention militar, 1823-1855', 
in A. Annino et al (eds.), America Latina dallo stato coloniale alio stato nazione (Milan, 
1987), p. 574. This view has been further developed by Josefina Zoraida Vazquez in her 
article 'Political Plans and Collaboration Between Civilians and the Military, 1821-
1847', Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 15, no.l (January, 1996), pp. 19-38. 
27 Stevens, Origins of Instability, p. 27. 
development at the time.28 Similarly, Stevens has made an equally important 
contribution to our understanding of the period by departing from the 
conventional view that there were only two significant political factions,29 the 
conservatives and the liberals, giving as much attention to the beliefs 
expounded by the moderates.30 Moreover, recent research has also shown that 
the santanistas were another ideological movement during these years, and not 
just a gang of opportunists as has also been generally stated.31 
It is understandable that, within this recent approach, military 
interventionism has come to be seen more as a result of the turbulence of 
civilian politics than as the sole and exclusive cause for the continuous 
upheavals which characterised these years. It is interesting, however, that this 
notion that the military were used by the political factions was in fact echoed by 
the army throughout most of Latin America at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In effect it is the essence of what Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies 
defined as the 'politics of antipolitics'.32 In other words, the military, in 
countries such as Peru, contemplated the history of their nation and arrived at 
the conclusion that the permanent instability which had plagued their mother-
country was the fault of politics and above all of civilian politicians who had 
used the army for their own party interests rather than for the good of the 
nation. A perfect example of this can be found in a statement signed in 1921 by 
seventeen Peruvian army officers which read as follows: 
See Michael P. Costeloe, La Primera Republica Federal de Mexico (1824-1835) 
(Mexico, 1975) and The Central Republic in Mexico 1835-1846. Hombres de Bien in the 
age of Santa Anna (Cambridge, 1993). 
29 As, for example, in Krauze, Siglo de Caudillos, pp. 146-88 and E. Williamson, 
The Penguin History of Latin America (Harmondsworth, 1992), pp. 234-47 and 258-65. 
30 See Stevens, Origins of Instability. For a critical study of the view that political 
thought developed along two main ideological streams, one of conservatives, the other 
of liberals, see W. Fowler, 'Dreams of Stability: Mexican political thought during the 
"forgotten years". An analysis of the beliefs of the creole intelligentsia (1821-1853)', 
Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 14, no. 3 (September, 1995), pp. 287-312. 
Edmundo O'Gorman had already argued in 1977 that conservatives and liberals offered 
'dos tesis que acaban postulando lo mismo', in his Mexico. El Trauma de su Historia 
(Mexico City, 1977), p. 33. The use of the term 'conservative' is also in itself 
problematic, given that it is an anachronism when applied to the 1820s, 1830s and early 
1840s. This why I have tended to use the term 'traditionalist' rather than 'conservative' 
in this study. For a redefinition of Mexican 'conservatism' in the nineteenth century, and 
a collection of essays which challenge the traditional view on the subject, see W. Fowler 
and H. Morales Moreno (eds.), El conservadurismo mexicano del siglo diecinueve 
(Puebla, forthcoming). 
31 See W. Fowler, 'The Repeated Rise of General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna', 
in W. Fowler (ed.) Authoritarianism in Latin America Since Independence (Westport, 
CT, 1996), pp. 1-30. 
32 See B. Loveman and T. Davies (eds.), The Politics of Antipolitics : The Military 
in Latin America (Nebraska, 1978). 
For some time now, since politics infiltrated the army, we military 
officers have been serving as steppingstones for unscrupulous 
politicians. They use our services, and then they promote us. This must 
stop. (...) We (must) assume the reins of government of the country in 
order to root out political influence, the worst of all plagues (...) The 
army, drawn from all social classes of the nation, must intervene 
directly in the management of the affairs of state.33 
In brief, military intervention was to become, in countries such as Peru, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, a crusade against politics; something which 
was not too distant from Porfirio Diaz's own technocratic state. The idea that 
generals like Santa Anna represented, to a certain extent, an early interpretation 
of antipolitics will be looked at further on. 
The Army as a Reflection of Society 
Finally, following on from the increasing awareness of the importance of 
politics and ideology at the time, there is the interpretation which does grant the 
military a political ideology. To quote Costeloe, 'the military-civilian distinction 
at the time was blurred, and many senior army officers devoted most of their 
time and energies to political intrigue'.34 Although they did not represent a 
military ideology as such, and neither did they intrigue for a specifically 
homogeneous praetorian political system, individual generals, colonels and 
officers upheld serious ideological beliefs: the stress of this interpretation being 
that these ideological beliefs were as varied as those which could be found in 
society. In other words, the military did uphold and defend political views, but 
not as a homogeneous class or entity. To quote Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, the 
army was not 'a monolithic entity, like the clergy and, as a reflection of the 
nation itself, it was a mosaic of ideas and attitudes'.35 
It is under this interpretation that, for instance, an analysis of the beliefs of 
General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga shows that he had very strong convictions 
regarding the role of the army and the kind of society that he hoped to create in 
Mexico.36 He believed that it was imperative to forge an alliance between the 
33 Ibid., p. 4. 
34 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 15. 
35 J.Z. Vazquez, 'Soldados alemanes en las huestes santanistas', Jahrbuch Fur 
Geschichte Von Staat, Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft LateinAmerikas, vol. 25 
(Sonderdruck, 1988), p. 417. 
36 See Costeloe, The Central Republic, and 'The Triangular Revolt in Mexico and 
the fall of Anastasio Bustamante, August-October 1841', Journal of Latin American 
Studies, vol. 20 (1988), pp. 337-60, and 'Los generales Santa Anna y Paredes y 
army and the upper classes, without excluding the Church. He argued that the 
proletariat had to be kept away from the political process, preventing members 
of the working classes from being elected to Congress. The reins of government 
had to lie with the 'upper classes, which are to politics what Generals are to 
War'.37 
In contrast, an analysis of the beliefs of General Jose Joaquin de Herrera 
shows that he was, unlike Paredes, a moderate liberal federalist, who did believe 
in representative government.38 As President of the Republic in 1845 he carried 
out reforms in the army which were extremely unpopular among the more 
reactionary military officers. His speeches to Congress of 15 December 1844 
and 1 January 1845 illustrate very clearly the extent to which he upheld 
reasoned political beliefs with the objective of directing a moderate course of 
change.39 
A synthesis of these four interpretations does offer what could be considered 
a fairly convincing portrait of the role of the military during this period. The 
break with monarchic and European rule brought about a vivacious conflict 
among the members of the Creole oligarchy who had attained political power. 
Almost immediately after independence was achieved, lawyers, writers, 
landowners and high-ranking military officers became deeply involved in the 
political debates of the period, sustaining ardent convictions over issues such as 
federalism vs. centralism, absolutism vs. constitutionalism, free market 
economic policies vs. state protectionism, secularism vs. Church power, etc. 
disintegrating into opposed masonic lodges, cliques and eventually parties. The 
military were as much a part of this process as the civilians. However, the 
absence of an arbitrating institution or figure inspired some members of the 
military to use force to resolve the political problems which were surfacing as a 
result of the virulent opposition of the different political factions. In some cases 
it was the civilian politicians who invited the intervention of the military; in 
others, generals with firm political convictions opted to intervene in favour of 
the cliques who represented their views; and, inevitably, there were also 
instances where a straightforward lust for power motivated some generals to 
revolt, using the political discourse of the period as an excuse. Moreover, with a 
backdrop of financial distress in which the troops were generally hungry, badly 
dressed, poorly equipped, and unpaid for most of the time, there was nothing for 
them to lose by joining a revolt. Thus, the history of the first decades of 
Arrillaga en Mexico, 1841-1843: Rivales por el poder o una copa mas', Historia 
Mexicana, vol. 39 (1989), pp. 417-40. 
37 Correspondencia 'Paredes y Arrillaga - Santa Anna', 29 April 1842, in Genaro 
Garcia, Documentos ineditos o muy raros para la historia de Mexico, vol. 56 (Mexico, 
1974). 
38 See T.E. Cotner, The Military and Political Career of Jose Joaquin de Herrera, 
1792-1854 (New York, 1969). 
39 El Siglo XIX, 15 December 1844 and 2 January 1845. 
independent life in Mexico remains one of political-military upheaval. The 
difference is that the view that this was exclusively the result of the behaviour 
(or misbehaviour) of an apolitical and predatory army has been challenged 
convincingly with the understanding that political beliefs and activities were a 
fundamental part of the developments of the period. 
Nevertheless, the mainstream view that the army did not have an ideology, 
or that if it did it was not as a united force, but more a matter of different 
individuals sustaining different political beliefs, is still not entirely satisfying. 
Military Ethos : Three Reasons for Questioning Mainstream 
Views on the Heterogeneous Nature of the Mexican Army 
There are three important reasons for questioning the belief that there was not a 
sense of corporateness in the army which by its very nature could represent a 
certain political ideology: (1) the regular army-civic/provincial militia dialectic; 
(2) the military ethos of 'civilised warfare', and (3) the importance of the fuero 
militar. 
The Regular Army vs Civic/Provincial Militia Dialectic 
Howard Cline's brief sketch of the beliefs which divided the centralists-
conservatives from the federalists-liberals significantly highlights the 
contrasting views these two factions had over the need for having a regular 
army or a civic/provincial militia: 
Ostensibly the issues of politics split Mexico into several groups. On the 
one hand were the Centralists, who favoured a strongly centralized 
Government, with little room for state or provincial autonomy or 
variations; this position was in general supported by the more 
conservative elements of society, especially Church and army. Opposed 
were Federalists, really in favour of confederation, to reduce the power 
of Mexico City by substituting local militia for the army, and limiting 
the functions of the national Government to the bare minimum.40 
The notion that, in general terms, liberals favoured local militias while 
conservatives advocated sustaining a large regular army is well researched.41 In 
40 Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960 (London, 1962), 
p. 18. 
41 See Pedro Santoni, 'A Fear of the People: The Civic Militia of Mexico in 1845', 
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 68, no.2 (May 1988), pp. 268-88 and Ray 
Stevens's words: 
Conservatives relied on the national army and planned to abolish the 
provincial and civic militias. Radicals, in contrast, depended on the 
civic and provincial militias and hoped to use them to replace the 
national army. (...) Moderates hoped to restrict the power and privileges 
of the national army while limiting the militia units to those controlled 
by the propertied classes.42 
Needless to say, this conflict had been as much an issue in Bourbon Mexico as 
it became with independence.43 
Evidently there were financial arguments and there were strategic arguments 
in the conflict which developed over the need to increase either the regular army 
or the militias. However, it is obvious that the main issue was a political one. In 
Bourbon Mexico, weakening the regular units whilst strengthening the militia 
units was perceived by the Spanish authorities as a dangerous strategy which 
essentially gave military power to the Mexican people. 
Following independence, these political considerations were not 
significantly different. Traditionalists believed in strengthening the regular army 
because it was the safeguard of a strong and conservative government. Radicals, 
in contrast, believed in strengthening the militias so that an anti-progressive 
militaristic regime could be controlled, or even overthrown, by armed civilians 
who did not belong to the reactionary regular army. In the United States the 
liberal view of the military was no different from that in Mexico. As Samuel 
Huntingdon points out, US liberals believed that, '(1) Large military forces are 
a threat to liberty (...) (2) Large military forces are a threat to democracy (...) (3) 
Large military forces are a threat to economic prosperity (...) (and) (4) Large 
military forces are a threat to peace'.44 A brief look at the opinions which were 
expressed by liberal civilians and high-ranking army officers illustrates quite 
clearly how this conflict remained deeply political in independent Mexico. 
Valentin Gomez Farias, who, according to Stevens, 'controlled the Sixth 
Battalion in 1833 and provided the men with three meals a day', whose son led 
Broussard, T h e Mexican Liberals and the Curbing of the Military's Powers: Success or 
Failure', Annals of the Southeastern Conference on Latin American Studies (March 
1979), pp. 5-14. 
42 Stevens, Origins of Instability, p. 34. 
43 See Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico; Lyle N. McAlister, The 'Fuero 
Militar' in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Westport, 1974) and T h e Reorganization of the 
Army of New Spain, 1763-1766', Hispanic American Historical Review, vol 33, no.l 
(February, 1953); Maria del Carmen Velazquez, El Estado de Guerra en Nueva Espana, 
1760-1808 (Mexico, 1950). 
44 Samuel P. Huntingdon, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations (New York, 1957), p. 156. 
the 'Libertad' Battalion,45 and who, according to Frederick Shaw, supported 
these militia units as if they were his own 'private army',46 argued, for instance, 
in 1845, faced with the threat of the restoration of a monarchy, that if the people 
were to be armed, 'they would vigorously oppose those that want to give us a 
king'.47 His strong belief in arming the people and wresting power from the 
traditionalist military was evident in his reforms as acting President in 1833 and 
1834. In the view of Ricardo Delgado Roman, 'Gomez Farias (...) hoped to 
establish his own political consolidation with a military balance between all the 
federal entities of the Republic'.48 It was under his administration that, albeit 
cautiously, reforms were carried out which strengthened the militias and 
curtailed the power of the regular army.49 
In contrast, under the traditionalist Bustamante-Alaman administration of 
1830-1832, the militias were drastically reduced. Facio's explanation for this 
measure, in his annual ministerial report of 1830, rested on economic grounds: 
if peace is consolidated in the States and the rumours of another Spanish 
invasion have disappeared completely, there should be no need for an 
Active Militia; (its members) will be able to retire, and then the public 
treasury will no longer have to bear the burden of paying their 
expenses.50 
The reasoning behind such a reform was, nevertheless, evidently political. 
As events would show later, it was with those politicised and federalist militias 
which had not been eradicated that Santa Anna was able to bring down the 
administration of Bustamante in 1832. 
To the more traditionalist generals such as Juan Nepomuceno Almonte 
(Minister of War 1840-41 and 1846), who, despite being the son of the 
revolutionary insurgent hero, Jose Maria Morelos, dedicated the latter part of 
his life to supporting the Empire of Maximilian, the militias represented a social 
Stevens, Origins of Instability, p. 34. 
46 Frederick Shaw, 'Poverty and Politics in Mexico City, 1824-1854', unpubl. PhD 
Diss. University of Florida, 1975, pp. 330-1. 
47 Letter from Valentin Gomez Farias to Manuel Gonzalez Cosio, 25 October 1845, 
quoted in Santoni, 'A Fear of the People', p. 286. 
48 Ricardo Delgado Roman (ed.), Valentin Gomez Farias: Ideario Reformista 
(Guadalajara, 1958), p. 144. For samples of the legislation he proposed concerning the 
militias see pp. 145-56. On Valentin Gomez Farias as a reformist rather than as radical, 
see W. Fowler, 'Valentin Gomez Farias: Perceptions of Radicalism in Independent 
Mexico, 1821-1847', Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 15, no.l (January, 
1996), pp. 39-62. 
49 See Costeloe, La Primer a Republica Federal, p. 378. 
50 Facio, Memoria (. •.) 1830, p. 1. 
as well as a political threat. The arming of the populace was detrimental to 
peace and stability. In 1845, his views on the militia, could not be clearer: 
Since no judgement was used in arming the people, I have very grave 
fears that they will indulge in all kinds of excesses, thus repeating the 
scenes of 1828. In that event, I shall be occupied in controlling the mob, 
and I shall even send the troops against them if need be.51 
In fact, what becomes increasingly obvious by looking at the annual 
ministerial reports of the Ministers of War from 1822 to 1852,52 is that there 
was almost a general consensus among the different generals who assumed this 
office throughout the three decades regardless of the fact that they were, on 
paper, representing different administrations with ostensibly different political 
agendas, that the regular army needed to be strengthened whilst the militias 
needed to be weakened, if not completely disbanded. 
In 1826, although the army was meant to consist of 22,750 regular troops 
and 42,047 militia troops, the reality already pointed to the fact that of the two 
kinds of regiments, only one of them had received the serious attention which 
was required to fill the number of vacancies. There were 22,750 regular troops: 
the expected number, but only 21,577 militia troops. Although General Manuel 
Gomez Pedraza (Minister of War 1825-28) believed in 1826 that a different 
form of recruitment could improve the militias, and was also prepared to state 
that ideally there could be 'nothing more useful or commendable than (a group 
of men) instructed in military maneouvres who, without burdening the public 
treasury, are prepared at all times to defend the rights of the nation',53 by 1827 
he had arrived at the conclusion that 'the bases upon which the formation of the 
active militia was established are no longer suitable for its purpose, and (...) it is 
necessary to change direction'.54 During his term in office, the regular army 
increased to 32,161 men in 1827,55 and to 33,373 men in 1828.56 Moreover, 
unlike the militias: 
the soldiers, with a strong sense of duty and without listening to any 
other voice but that of the law, march to wherever the government sends 
them, calming political disagreements, reestablishing (law and) order 
51 Quoted and translated in Santoni, 'A Fear of the People', p. 287. 
52 These Memorias de Guerra can be found in the British Library, T1 1-38. 
53 Manuel Gomez Pedraza, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la 
Guerra presentada a las camaras en enero de 1826 (Mexico, 1826), p. 6. 
54 M. Gomez Pedraza, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la 
Guerra presentada a las camaras en enero de 1827 (Mexico, 1827), p. 10. 
55 Ibid. 
56 M. Gomez Pedraza, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la 
Guerra presentada a las camaras en enero de 1828 (Mexico, 1828), p. 6. 
and guaranteeing public peace.57 
By the time Valentin Gomez Farias became acting vice-president and 
pressed for strengthening the militias, there were less than 5,509 men serving in 
the militia.58 
The santanista General Jose Maria Tornel (Minister of War 1833, 1835-37, 
1839, 1841-44, 1846 and 1853), not surprisingly used the militias to his 
advantage when conspiring against the government. For instance, according to 
him, the reason he was suspended as Governor of the Federal District in 
October 1828 was because he had four thousand men of the militia at his 
command, and it was feared, following the news of Santa Anna's uprising in 
Jalapa, that he would use them to take over the National Palace.59 However, 
despite his decision in 1839 to increase the number of militias as an emergency 
measure in the war against France, once in office he was equally dedicated to 
increasing the regular army and reducing the militias. In 1835, he stressed that 
'the superiority of a disciplined and hardened army over irregular masses is as 
clear as that of light over darkness, of science over ignorance'.60 In 1839, even 
though he advocated increasing the militias when confronted with the threat of a 
French invasion, giving them the new name of Defensores de la Patria, he still 
associated the past militias with an 'organization viciosa'. His Defensores were 
merely a product of the need to 'adjust to the demands of war'.61 
Similarly, General Mariano Arista (Minister of War 1848-51) defended the 
regular Guardia Nacional and an army in which more than two thirds of the 
recruits belonged to the regular regiments as opposed to the militias. Although 
this regular army was much reduced from past years, being made up of 4,744 
men in 1851 (the militias consisted of 262 individuals)62, he was convinced that 
57 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
58 Jose Joaquin Parres, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la 
Guerra presentada a las camaras el dia 26 de abril de 1833 (Mexico, 1833), p. 1. 
59 J.M. Tornel y Mendivil, Breve reseha historica de los acontecimientos mas 
notables de la nation mexicana (Mexico, 1985), p. 339. 
60 J.M. Tornel y Mendivil, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de 
Guerra y Marina, leida en la Camara de Representantes en la sesion del dia veinte y 
tres de marzo y en la de Senadores en la del veinte y cuatro del mismo mes y ano de 
1835 (Mexico, 1835), p. 6. 
61 J.M. Tornel y Mendivil, Memoria de la Secretaria de Estado y del Despacho de 
Guerra y Marina, leida por el Excmo. Sr. General Jose Maria Tornel, en la Camara de 
Diputados el dia 7 de enero de 1839, y en la de Senadores el 8 del mismo (Mexico, 
1839), p. 16. 
62 Mariano Arista, Memoria del Secretario de Estado del Despacho de Guerra y 
Marina leida en la Camara de Diputados el 3 y en la de Senadores en 4 de enero de 
1851 (Mexico, 1851), Estados num.7 and num.12. 
as the troops were made up of dedicated volunteers their service to the nation 
was impeccable.63 
The only general of any significant importance who appeared to support the 
militias was General Jose Joaquin de Herrera (Minister of War 1833-34). As 
Minister of War in 1834 he proposed reforming the recruitment of the militias 
so that it would be made up of individuals who were dedicated to the cause. In 
his words, those who would voluntarily join the militias would thus make 'a 
very sacred contract with society'.64 However, as Pedro Santoni has shown, 
even Herrera as President in 1845 was not completely convinced of fully 
restructuring the army to the extent that the civic militia would become the 
dominant core of the Mexican army. Moreover, to quote Santoni, 'Herrera's 
initial lack of confidence in the civic militia had dire consequences for his 
regime'.65 As he did not strengthen those forces which would have defended the 
liberal government he represented, General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga was 
able to overthrow him with the traditionalist regular army. 
It is evident that high-ranking officers, as a group, supported the 
strengthening of the regular army and the weakening of the militia. In other 
words, as a group, they opposed the liberal attempts to give military power to 
the people. Moreover, it is implicit in the way that the liberals criticised the 
regular army and in the way that traditionalists and high ranking officers 
criticised the militia that there was, inevitably, a political standpoint, shared by 
the majority of generals, which was in essence conservative. If the military view 
of the militias was a unifying factor among the military, more so was what can 
be defined as the military ethos of 'civilised warfare'. 
'Civilised Warfare' 
It is a well known fact that in Europe in the eighteenth century officers did not 
shoot to kill other officers of the enemy army. In the words of Alfred Vagts: 
1851 (Mexico, 1851), Estados num.7 and num.12. 
63 The US military historian R.S. Ripley pointed out in 1849, that 'The effect of the 
war upon Mexico has been and will continue to be greatly beneficial', arguing that by 
having on the one hand swept away the prestige of the army and having on the other 
hand had the consequence of a drastic reduction in the existing number of troops, there 
was now 'comparative quietude' and 'apparent stability of a government administered 
upon republican principles'. The War with Mexico (New York, 1970) quoted in Jan 
Bazant, 'From independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821-1867', in L. Bethell (ed.), 
Mexico since independence (Cambridge, 1992), p. 26. 
64 Jose Joaquin de Herrera, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la 
Guerra, leida en la Camara de Diputados el dia 11 de abril de 1834, y en la Senadores 
el dia 12 del mismo (Mexico, 1834), p. 13. 
65 Santoni, 'A Fear of the People', p. 288. 
Owing to intermarriage among the nobility of Europe and the sense of 
class solidarity, European army officers (were) (....) rather tender of one 
another even when arrayed on opposing sides, by sticking to certain 
points of 'honor', as they conceived it, they (...) refused to resort to 
certain 'tricks' even to gain advantages in war.66 
In independent Mexico a similar sense of honour and class solidarity 
developed among the high ranking officers. Although they did not belong to a 
feudal aristocracy as had been the case in Europe, they did belong to the Creole 
elite which had come to power as a result of the break with Spain. Evidence of 
this can be found in the bloodless nature of most of the interior revolts and 
armed conflicts of the period and in the way that, time and again, those generals 
who had started unsuccessful pronunciamientos were forgiven fairly soon after 
the event. 
To quote Ruth Olivera and Liliane Crete, 'Contrary to the rule elsewhere, 
Mexican revolutions were seldom sanguinary. Contemporary observers even 
had the feeling that Mexicans fired upon each other from safe distances in order 
to avoid casualties'.67 It is worth noting here a few examples of how this 
military ethos of'civilised warfare' was apparent in independent Mexico. 
The build-up to the revolt of Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Montano in 
December 1827 and the events which transpired in the resulting battle of 
Tulancingo on 7 January 1828 exemplify the notion that high ranking officers 
in the Mexican army belonged to a military brotherhood. As early as a month 
before the revolt began, the President General Guadalupe Victoria was not only 
aware that there was an escoces™ conspiracy to overthrow him, but he also 
Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism : Civilian and Military (London, 1959), p. 
96. 
67 Ruth R. Olivera and Liliane Crete, Life in Mexico under Santa Anna, 1822-1855 
(Norman and London, 1991), p. 167. 
68 Escoces was the name given to the members of the Scottish Rite of Masons. This 
masonic organisation was introduced in Mexico during the War of Independence. 
Although it was perceived as a kind of loosely-defined liberal political organisation to 
begin with, and played a significant role in bringing down Iturbide's Empire, 
advocating, as a result, an anti-absolutist agenda, it nevertheless became, during the first 
three years of the First Federal Republic, the forum where the more traditionalist (and 
affluent) members of the Creole elite discussed the politics of the Republic. In contrast, 
the masonic Rite of York, which was formally consolidated in Mexico in 1825 through 
the exertions of the American Minister Plenipotenciary Joel Poinsett, was far more 
populist in its inclinations, with a stress on promoting US, as opposed to European, 
political values. By 1826, the Congressional elections were fought out between the 
escoceses and the yorkinos\ and the politics of the subsequent two years (1827-28) 
witnessed an accentuated power struggle between members of these two masonic 
knew that General Nicolas Bravo was going to lead the pronunciamiento 
against him. According to Tornel, his then personal secretary and adviser: 
Sr. Victoria, with the greatest grief, found out in time about the deals of 
his friend and colleague Sr. Bravo, and he commissioned individuals he 
confided in to dissuade him from his purpose. However, this was to no 
avail...69 
Bravo could not be persuaded to abandon the revolt. However, even then, 
other than advising him against revolting, no serious actions were taken to end 
the uprising before it started. Furthermore, even when Montano pronounced in 
Otumba, and Bravo set off to Tulancingo, north-east of Mexico City, to take on 
the leadership of the revolt, Victoria decided not to intervene immediately: 
even when he was told the time of (Bravo's) departure and his 
destination, (Victoria) vigorously refused to authorise his imprisonment 
(...).'In order to justify', he said, 'the measures of the government 
against Sr. Bravo, it is indispensable that he himself exposes his conduct 
to the eyes of the nation'.70 
Clearly, once Bravo openly embraced Montano's plan, Victoria had no other 
alternative but to end the revolt by force. As a result General Vicente Guerrero, 
at the command of 1,500 men, set off to Tulancingo to fight the rebels. Bravo 
only had 600 men from the Battalion of Mextitlan. The actual battle was no 
different from the majority of the armed conflicts of the period. At the crack of 
dawn, Guerrero launched his attack on the village of Tulancingo from the 
outskirts of the Hacienda of San Antonio Ahuehuetitla. Bravo's men, in a matter 
of minutes, dispersed and ran away. Only eight men were actually killed in the 
battle and there were hardly any wounded. Not far from Tulancingo, all of the 
ringleaders of the revolt were caught and made prisoner.71 Although, in terms of 
the politics of the period, Bravo's defeat came to represent the end of the 
escoceses' hopes to acquire power and allowed the yorkinos72 to become overtly 
dominant in government, especially as Bravo's revolt was made to appear as a 
pro-Spanish uprising in the wake of the expulsion laws of December 1827, it 
was not long before members of the military, even when they were outspoken 
yorkinos, proposed offering Bravo and his comrades a general amnesty. Only 
three months after Tulancingo, on 15 April 1828, Tornel, the 'Enemigo de 
organisations. For a closer look at ideologies they sustained see my The Liberal Origins 
of Mexican Conservatism, 1821-1832 (Glasgow: Institute of Latin American Studies, 
forthcoming). 
69 Tornel, Breve reseha historica, p. 178. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., pp. 200-1. 
72 See footnote 68, above. 
Escocia decidido',73 proposed to the Chamber of Deputies that an amnesty be 
granted to all those members of the military who had been involved in the Plan 
of Montafio, including Bravo.74 Although the prisoners of Tulancingo were not 
granted the amnesty, they were exempted from the death penalty. Moreover, 
generals Bravo and Miguel Barragan, albeit sentenced to exile, were allowed to 
receive half of their pay as generates de division?5 They were all back in 
Mexico by 1829. 
Other instances of battles and military actions which were brief in their 
duration and which were resolved without bloodshed may be noted: Victoria's 
showdown in Huajuapan against the revolt of Colonel Antonio Le6n and his 
brother Manuel in August 1824,76 the military actions which brought about the 
fall of Vicente Guerrero's government in 1829 following the Plan of Jalapa; the 
pronunciamientos which brought an end to Gomez Farias's liberal 
administration in 1834 following the Plan of Cuernavaca; the battle of 
Guadalupe in Zacatecas of 11 May 1835 between Francisco Garcia and Santa 
Anna; the Triangular Revolt of 1841, etc. As one US staff officer wrote, 
following the American intervention in Mexico of 1847: 'this matter of being 
killed was not....what they had been accustomed to'.77 Even the liberal uprising 
of 15 July 1841, in which many inhabitants of Mexico City were killed or 
wounded in the streets, was, as witnessed by Fanny Calderon de la Barca: 'like 
a game at chess, in which kings, castles, knights and bishops, are making 
different moves, while the pawns are looking on or taking no part whatever'.78 
Evidently there were exceptions. However, these were few and are worth 
noting because of what they tell us about this sense of class solidarity which 
was apparent in the behaviour of the high ranking officers towards each other. 
These exceptions include the executions of Iturbide in 1824, Guerrero in 1831 
and General Jose Antonio Mejia in 1839. The death of Iturbide is the least 
El Correo de la Federation Mexicana, 22 February 1828. 
74 Ibid, 29 May 1828. 
75 Ibid. 
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Oaxaca because 'cualquiera que fuese el partido que adoptara para terminar la sedition, 
seria siempre de perdida para su credito, y lo alejaria del supremo mando de la 
republica'. As it happened, Victoria succeeded in quelling the revolt without any blood 
shed, and it was a decisive factor in the victory in the forthcoming election. See Tornel, 
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77 Quoted in Olivera and Crete, Life in Mexico, p. 167. 
78 Fanny Calderon de la Barca, Life in Mexico (London, 1987), p. 412. 
relevant of these three, mainly because the order of execution was issued by a 
Spaniard. His death was lamented by the Mexican military as a whole, and, 
indeed, the initial news of his execution came as a horrible shock to a 
generation of high ranking officers who already possessed a sense of 'civilised 
warfare'.79 The case of Guerrero, however, is far more representative of the 
ways in which a military class of Creole officers had emerged in the war of 
independence. As Jan Bazant argues: 
The cruel treatment of Guerrero requires an explanation. Bravo had 
been defeated in 1827 but was merely exiled and there were other 
similar cases. It is reasonable to ask, therefore, why in the case of 
Guerrero the government resorted to the ultimate penalty. The clue is 
provided by Zavala who, writing several years later, noted that Guerrero 
was of mixed blood and that the opposition to his presidency came from 
the great landowners, clerics and Spaniards resident in Mexico. These 
people could not forget the war of independence with its threat of social 
and racial subversion. Despite his revolutionary past, the wealthy Creole 
Bravo belonged to this 'gentleman's club', as did the cultured Creole 
Zavala, even with his radicalism. Hence Guerrero's execution was 
perhaps a warning to men considered as socially and ethnically inferior 
not to dare to dream of becoming president.80 
As for Mejia, in 1839, the explanation resides in the fact that Mejia was 
responsible for committing treason on two fronts: (1) he had played a 
significant part in illegally selling large areas of Texas to American colonisers 
in 183181 and (2) he had turned against the government in 1839, at a time when 
the nation was in arms fighting off a foreign attack on the integrity of their 
country. Nevertheless, even then, this was seen to be an extreme measure, as 
can be seen in the memoirs of Colonel Manuel Maria Gomez, who carried out 
the order with disgust.82 
In brief, the way high ranking officers were exiled for short periods of time 
and then forgiven for rebelling against the different governments of independent 
Mexico, together with the fact that there was a conscious effort on their part to 
avoid serious warfare during the many internal conflicts of the era, adopting a 
'gentlemanly' conduct with one another, points to the fact that (1) high ranking 
officers in their majority belonged to the same Creole social class, and (2) that 
79 See Tornel, Breve reseha historica, pp. 17-8. 
80 Bazant, 'From independence to the Liberal Republic', p. 12. 
81 Jose Maria Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Mexico independiente, 
1822-1846, Tomo 1 (Mexico, 1982), p. 548. See also Tornel, Manifestacion del C. J.M. 
Tornel (Mexico, 1833). 
82 Genaro Garcia (ed.), Documentos ineditos o muy raros para la historia de 
Mexico. Tomo XXXIV, Memorias del Coronel Manuel Maria Gimenez (Mexico, 1911), 
pp. 78-9. 
this class consciousness, paired with a military ethos which belonged 
exclusively to the high ranking officers of the army, acted as a unifying factor 
which in many ways levelled the political differences of separate individuals 
and created what could be considered a class which had its own rules of 
conduct. The notion that the military belonged to a separate class with its own 
codes of behaviour and where individual differences came second, to a certain 
extent, to a sense of belonging to a privileged club of people, which by its very 
nature allowed individual rebellions to be forgiven as long as they had been 
perpetuated by a high ranking officer/member of the clan,83 was certainly 
enhanced by the fuero militar. 
The Importance of the Fuero Militar 
Lyle McAlister's in-depth study of the fuero militar in Bourbon Mexico 
provides a very clear explanation of how it came to be one of the founding 
pillars upon which this military class was formed. To quote McAlister: 
the privileges granted to the Army of New Spain were probably the 
most important factor in the creation of the praetorian tradition in 
Mexico.(...) The possession of special privileges enhanced (the 
military's) sense of uniqueness and superiority, and at the same time 
rendered it virtually immune from civil authority. (...) As the prestige of 
the monarchy declined (...) the army emerged as an autonomous (...) 
institution.84 
The fuero militar, by which members of the military could avoid being 
punished by the civilian authorities, and which dated back to seventeenth 
century Spain, remained intact following independence. It is evident that this 
privilege continued to enhance the sense that the military belonged to a separate 
class. With this in mind it comes as no surprise that when the Gomez Farias 
administration in 1834 attempted to end the fuero, the regular army rose up 
against the radicals in a unanimous call of 'Santa Anna y los fiieros'. There 
were pronunciamientos in Puebla, Orizaba, Jalapa, Oaxaca, Cuernavaca, 
Cuautla, Jonocate, Miacatla, Tetecala, Temascaltepec, Cholula, Huejocingo, 
Tepeaca and San Martin, to name but a few.85 
It is worth noting here that those rebellions which were carried out by people 
who did not belong to this military class were brutally repressed by the government 
troops. The wars with the Yaqui Indians in the north of Mexico (1841-43) and the Maya 
Indians in Yucatan during the Caste War of 1847-48 were unquestionably bloody. 
84 McAlister, The Fuero Militar' in New Spain, p. 14. 
85 See Costeloe, La Primera Republica Federal, pp. 428-9. 
In fact, the reforms which were proposed by a predominantly liberal and 
civilian administration in 1834, and the predominantly traditionalist and 
military response they received, is the clearest example, at a time when the 
civilian-military divide was often blurred, of there having been two opposed 
groups as defined by their profession which embraced opposed political 
ideologies. Again, if the attitude of the military as a whole towards the roles of 
the militias and the regular army suggests that the military supported those 
views which were sustained by the traditionalists, the same applies here. The 
army revolted against the liberals because they were curtailing their privileges, 
and in doing so supported the traditionalist/conservative claim of preserving as 
much of the colonial system as was possible. Although more research needs to 
be dedicated to the fuero militar in independent Mexico, it is evident, from the 
army's united reaction to Gomez Farias's reforms in 1834, and the support the 
fuero received in the various annual ministerial reports of the Ministry of War 
throughout the age of Santa Anna, that it remained one of the most important 
features of the legal system of the time in perpetuating a sense of class solidarity 
among the military. Even in 1852, as certain reforms in the fuero started to be 
discussed in an attempt to bring the army within civilian jurisdiction, General 
Manuel Robles (Minister of War 1851-1852) continued to protect those 
essential aspects of the privilege by which the regular army would continue to 
be treated as a distinct and separate class: 
There will only be one fuero de guerra, and it will be enjoyed 
exclusively in criminal matters, with the known exceptions previously 
established by law, and in those cases in which the misdemeanours or 
offences are strictly military-related.86 
As will be seen, these considerations are important in analysing the politics 
of the high ranking officers of the Mexican Army. 
The Reformism of the Ministers of War 
In order to arrive at a definition of the political ideology or identity of the 
regular army in Mexico it is necessary to pay special attention to two issues, 
which, further to those questions which have already been noted (the regular 
army vs. militia dialectic; the military ethos of 'civilised warfare'; and the 
importance of the fuero militar) include an analysis of santanismo within the 
context of early professionalisation concentrating on the enlightened reformism 
of the Memorias de Guerra, and an analysis of the views which were upheld by 
the majority of influential high ranking officers (namely the Ministers of War) 
between 1822 and 1852. 
Manuel Robles, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Guerra y 
Marina, leida en la Camara de Diputados los dias 30 y 31 de enero, y en la de 
Senadores en 13 de febrero de 1852 (Mexico, 1852), p. 116. 
General Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil 
The reformism of the Ministers of War during this period was acute. Improving 
the education of the army, forging an effective engineers corps, developing an 
equally efficient medical corps, reforming the existing systems of recruitment 
and discipline, finding a fairer system of incentives and means of 
encouragement, and attempting to guarantee pensions for retired army officers 
and/or for their widows and families are concerns which can be found in all of 
the Memorias de Guerra. A closer look specifically at General Jose Maria 
Tornel's ministerial reports for 1835, 1839 and 1844, serves as an important 
starting point for understanding the extent to which the Ministers of War were 
reformists. Concentrating on Tornel, in particular, is also important because, of 
all the Ministers of War, he was the one who held the office on more occasions 
and for a longer period of time than any of the others during this period. Whilst 
he was more emphatic in his reformism than the rest, it is nevertheless clear 
from analysing all of the ministerial reports of the period that his initiatives and 
proposals reflected a common and generalised concern among the Ministers of 
War to improve the nature of the Mexican army. 
When he became Minister of War in 1835, one of the main problems he said 
he encountered was the army's general lack of education. As most of the 
soldiers were recruited from the peasantry, the working classes and the marginal 
sectors of society, few could read or write: 
Having destined members from the most ignorant and lowest sectors of 
society to make up the ranks of the army, there have been cases where 
in certain corps there was not a single individual who could be 
promoted to the rank of corporal or sergeant, given that nobody 
satisfied the requisites specified in the ordinance.87 
He did not hesitate to pin the responsibility for their impoverished and 
ignorant state on the Spanish government: 'the Spanish government opposed the 
idea of providing an elementary education to the people'.88 Moreover, 
'education was so poor that a man who knew the first letters of the alphabet 
became the wise man of the village, the perpetual secretary of the town hall and 
the assessor of the municipal authorities'.89 However, by 1835, fourteen years 
had passed since independence had been achieved. Tornel was aware of this, 
87 Jose Maria Tornel, Memoria del secretario...de guerra y marina (J.M. Tornel), 
leida en la camara de representantes en la sesion del dia veinte y tres de marzo, y en la 
de senadores en la del veinte y cuatro del mismo mes y ano de 1835 (Mexico, 1835), p. 
21. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
and made a point of admitting that little had been done to improve this Spanish 
legacy of illiteracy and ignorance: 'Having achieved our independence, 
education did not receive the attention which was to be expected'.90 He did not 
criticise any of the previous Ministers of War for this. As can be seen from the 
introduction to the ministerial report, in Tornel's mind internal conflicts had 
made it very difficult for the army to carry out any of its long term reforms. In 
the true spirit of the enlightenment,91 he argued that a primary education was the 
foundation of all sciences, and that it was, moreover, 'necessary to improve the 
social condition of the people'.92 
To support his views, he referred his audience to the resolutions which had 
been made by the Duke of Kent to cure this same disease of ignorance inherent 
in his Royal Scottish Regiment. Apparently, according to Tornel, the prince 'of 
sweet and pleasant memory to all philanthropists and lovers of knowledge' had 
founded a school for his soldiers which was to be run by a sergeant who had 
been educated with the Lancasterian methodology. Furthermore, in November 
1811, 'the Duke of York, general and head of the British Army, established 
regimental schools, by order of the government, awarding the teachers the 
salary and privileges of a sergeant'. Tornel argued that they ought to follow this 
example: 'Mexicans are convinced (...) of the need to adopt this happy policy in 
all of the corps of the army'.93 
Therefore, on 23 March 1835 he proposed that a sergeant be made 
responsible for teaching the alphabet to the soldiers in each company. Initially 
this sergeant would teach eight soldiers at a time. Moreover, these soldiers 
would not be expected to perform any other duty while attending classes, and he 
proposed that as an incentive, those who made the most of these lessons, 'the 
most hardworking', could be promoted to either corporals or sergeants. He 
offered twenty-five pesos as a monthly payment to each corps in order to cover 
the expenses of this educational programme. Books were to be provided 
90 Ibid. 
91 Tornel's belief that it was the duty of a benevolent and philanthropic government 
to provide a basic education to the ignorant and illiterate masses of its country dates back 
to the previous century, and is characteristic of the so-called age of enlightenment which 
was experienced in France, Britain, Spain and Prussia under the auspices of benign 
despotism. Among Spain's exponents of 'La Ilustracion' and the promotion of primary 
education, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos clearly influenced Tornel with his beliefs, 
professing maxims such as: 'Si desais el bien de vuestra patria, abrid a todos sus hijos el 
derecho de instruirse, multiplicando las escuelas de primeras letras'. See G.M. de 
Jovellanos, Memoria sobre la education publica (Madrid, 1936), p. 123. For the 
Mexican elite's 'enlightened' approach to education in the independent Mexico, see W. 
Fowler, T h e Compania Lancasteriana and the elite in independent Mexico 1822-1845', 
TESSERAE, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, vol. 4 (Summer, 1996), pp. 
613-42. 
92 Tornel, Memoria... 1835, p. 21. 
93 Ibid., pp. 21-4. 
separately by the serving Minister of War who was also obliged to inform 
Congress of the progress of these schools, making any necessary observations 
arising from the experience as a whole. 
His concern about education was not limited solely to the teaching of the 
elementary principles required to achieve a basic level of literacy. In the same 
report he showed concern over what he defined as 'Military Scientific 
Education'. This referred mainly to the corps of Engineers he had helped to 
create in 1827. It was also concerned with the training of the Medical Corps, as 
will be seen further on. 
The Engineers Corps, founded in 1827, had never become the thriving 
scientific division he had hoped for in his initial proposal of 5 November. In 
fact, on 16 November 1834, the small number of existing engineers had been 
further reduced. Tornel stated that this was scandalous, that it was imperative, if 
they were to become a truly civilised nation, to be able to boast of a functional 
Engineers Corps. To achieve such an aim, it was fundamental for the army to 
have an efficient and fully organised school which could provide them with the 
right number of adequately trained engineers. 
One of the initial problems that had to be overcome was that ever since the 
Engineers Corps had been created, there had been little incentive for bright 
students to enrol. The reason for this was obvious: 'A young educated man 
finds better and more stimulating prospects in any other career than in the army. 
It is fundamental, if we want to count upon the services of worthy men, to 
ensure that their future is (...) secure in the army.'94 
In other words, it was absurd to expect to have an Engineers Corps made up 
of volunteers with no stable income and no pension guaranteed. The military 
hospitals were suffering from an identical problem. Doctors, like engineers, 
made a better living outside the army than in it. For this reason, Tornel 
advocated a well-organised school that guaranteed a complete apprenticeship in 
the army as well as a respectable wage which would encourage those who had 
plans of becoming either engineers or doctors to do so within the military 
profession. 
Nevertheless, for this to happen some essential reforms were needed to 
complete the organisation of the existing school of engineers. To begin with, 
Tornel stressed the fact that no soldier could become an officer within the 
Engineers Corps without being examined first. Until 1835, the situation was still 
one in which personal contacts were almost officially recognised and valued 
94 Ibid., p. 23. 
more than the knowledge required to achieve promotion, and the Engineers 
Corps was consequently in danger of becoming run by completely ignorant and 
incompetent officers. 
The second reform he proposed regarding the Engineers Corps was also a 
display of common sense. Until 1835, the lack of funds had meant that the 
School of Engineers was based on exclusively theoretical lessons. Tornel 
emphasised the notion that this was not enough to create a practical and 
technically-minded functional and serviceable corps of engineers: 'Scientific 
principles are not enough in themselves to form officers in Engineering; without 
practice they are as useless as isolated theories are'.95 Consequently he proposed 
that the school be established in the old fortress of Perote, which would enable 
the students to put their theories into practice: 
It is fundamental that we establish a school of (engineering) practice, in 
which the exactitude of the rules can be measured and where what has 
been learnt through calculations can be executed in practice. The school 
of practice could be established in the Fortress of Perote, and there, the 
engineers could carry out all the necessary exercises to enable them to 
develop their skills in preparing either the attack or defence of 
fortresses.96 
Once more, Tornel referred his audience to the successful and living 
example of the British Army. In 1771 the Academy of Artillery and the 
Academy of Engineers had been united in Woolwich. As these two forces were 
complementary they could aid each other with their education. He argued that 
this example deserved to be followed, 'allowing our officers from the two 
separate corps to study together those subjects which they share in common'.97 
For those few outstanding students, he suggested the incentive of sending them 
for a brief spell of time to West Point Academy in the United States and the 
French Polytechnic School of Paris. 
In theory, the time was ripe to execute all of these reforms. The only 
obstacle which could essentially prevent their successful execution was the 
disruption which came hand in hand with war; either internal or against a 
foreign power. Tornel made a point of remarking upon the way the internal 
turmoils of their country had consistently thwarted the implementation of their 
idealistic plans: 'if the political turmoils had not distracted our young engineers 
from their studies, our expectations,which seemed to be so well-founded in 
1831, would have been fulfilled'. As he lamented in this same report: 'It is and 
will always be lamentable that our constant political earthquakes prevent us 
from consolidating those establishments in which the honour, utility and glory 
95 Ibid., p. 24. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
of the nation are best served'.98 
By the time he wrote his next report in 1839, the list of continuous political 
upheavals included the disastrous war in Texas, and an equally disruptive 
conflict with France. The President had even been taken prisoner by US soldiers 
for an entire year. There had been violent revolts against General Anastasio 
Bustamante in San Luis, Rio Verde, Nuevo Mexico, Sonora, Ixtlahuaca and 
Real del Monte. They had had to survive what Tornel grimly defined as 'a crisis 
which could have driven society to madness and which has certainly shaken its 
foundations'.99 While he spoke in Congress on 7 January 1839, there were two 
wars that were still very much alive: the on-going French Pastry War and the 
major federalist revolt of Generals Urrea and Mejia in Tamaulipas: 
It is fundamental that we attend to two wars. We need to prepare and 
combine our defence mechanisms at a time when we lack resources. We 
need to quell internal revolts at a time when opinion is fatally divided. 
We need to bring about the triumph of the Mexican people against a 
foreign invader and sweeten at the same time our political passions, 
providing the nation with a firm direction so that it is not ruined, 
tormented or weakened any more than it has been as a result of our 
innumerable errings...100 
With this kind of agenda it was clear that reforms in education, which had 
been so strongly commended in 1835, had had to be delayed, not being an 
essential priority. 
Nevertheless, Tornel did not totally discard the philanthropic plans of 1835. 
Although the economic constraints on the country had meant that Chapultepec 
Castle had not been converted into a military school as foreseen in 1833, and 
the 'regular school of the army' had suffered the temporary blow of being 
closed down on 2 May 1837,101 some progress had in fact been made since 
1835. In January 1838 the regular school had been reopened. Congress had 
agreed to spend 36,000 pesos every year on Tornel's educational reforms. The 
number of soldiers learning to read and write had increased from the initial 
figure of eight at a time to two hundred in each company. Moreover, by 1838, 
not only were 'endowed individuals' being educated, but 'the military's orphans 
and children'. Tornel used this fact to defy all criticism; even when wars were 
crippling their country: 'the unjust enemies of our national representation will 
take back their criticisms in spite of themselves when they see that never before 
98 Ibid., p. 25. 
99 Tornel, Memoria...1839, p. 3. 
100 Ibid., p. 4. 
101 Ibid., p. 18. 
have the soldier's conditions been better than they are now'.102 Even though the 
plans of 1835 had not been completely put into practice, soldiers were being 
educated. Tornel did not allow the main preoccupation of Congress - that of 
ending the existing wars - to prevent him from reminding them that 'to educate 
the people results in securing its firm and permanent happiness'.103 
However, it was not until 1844 that Tornel, after three years of being in 
power, could feel a sense of satisfaction with the progress made in education 
within the military profession.104 Three years of uninterrupted work in the 
ministry105 meant that he had been able personally to ensure the implementation 
of his reforms. The schools he had talked of as a desirable aim were now a 
concrete part of military life to which he could refer in the present tense: 'A 
regular school is for the Mexican army a good, liberal and philosophical plan; 
the chosen means by which it has been established and developed have been 
appropriate and effective'.106 
The only improvements that he considered could be added to the present 
system were, relatively speaking, minor. He stated that their methodology could 
be revised; that it would be worth finding out whether the teachers were all 
capable 'abecedarians'; that it would also be recommendable to find a means of 
ensuring that time was not wasted; and that one would hope that all instructors 
followed the glorious example of the ex-deputy director of the school who was 
now unfortunately involved in even greater concerns of public interest.107 The 
fact remained, that after three years of Tornel as head of the armed forces, 
everything possible was being done, 'to achieve perfection in primary 
education'.108 
102 Ibid., p. 19. 
103 Ibid., p. 20. 
104 The period between October 1841 and June 1844 was the longest period of time 
in which Tornel served as minister without having to contend with any major 
catastrophes (ie. a war with a foreign power or a revolt/ coup d'etat! rebellion with 
widespread support). Although it was not a particularly peaceful period - compared to 
the 1830s which saw the war between Bustamante's administration and Guerrero's 
followers, Santa Anna's revolt which overthrew Bustamante, the Texan debacle, the 
major revolts of Urrea and Mejia and the French Pastry War - it was a time of relative 
peace in which certain reforms had the opportunity to develop in ways that had not been 
possible in the previous decade. The complacency inherent in the 1844 report is 
evidence of this. 
105 Although Tornel left Jose Maria Diaz Noriega in charge of the Ministry of War 
for just over a month in the autumn of 1843, and then again for a fortnight in the spring 
of 1844, from October 1841 to June 1844, Tornel was responsible for the Ministry of 
War without interruption 
106 Tornel, Memoria... 1844 , p. 75. 
107 General Pedro Garcia Conde, the ex-deputy of the school was now director of 
the school of the Corps of Engineers. 
108 Tornel, Memoria.... 1844, p. 75. 
This same sense of achievement and fulfilment applied to the education of 
the Corps of Engineers. In fact, there was more reason for him to be satisfied 
with the improvements which had been carried out in this force, as it had been 
the one to suffer most directly from the previous years of wars and revolts. In 
March 1839 there were only five students. In subsequent years, once he had 
returned to assume the Ministry of War, the number of students had risen to 
234. They had a good pass rate as well: 203 of their students had gone on to 
become officers. There were presently 62 students in the process of taking their 
exams, showing very promising work. The exams taken in December 1843 had 
been very satisfactory. Tornel was confident: 'in the years to come this national 
creation will provide even more abundant and reasoned fruits, and it will be 
considered one of the glories of independent Mexico'.109 
As was the case with education, Tornel also displayed a reiterated concern, 
throughout his career as Minister of War, for improving the medical service of 
the army. In his 1835 report he strongly advocated rescuing the Medical Corps 
from oblivion. The Cuerpo de Sanidad Militar, originally founded in 1829, had 
suffered a similar fate to the Engineers Corps due to the political upheavals the 
country had undergone following the Plan of Jalapa and Bustamante's rise to 
power. Alleged limited resources and a reduced number of medical staff had led 
the Bustamante regime to reduce the Medical Corps' funds in order to finance 
other enterprises. Tornel thought that it was fundamental: 
that such a branch which is as important and worthy of our 
consideration as the health of those who fight to defend the nation, is 
put right, not only to show that our nation is a munificent one, but to 
prove that it does not affect ignorance of the fortunes of those who risk 
their lives for it and serve it so advantageously.110 
The two main problems that needed to be confronted were the obvious lack 
of funding and the absence of any significant number of fully-trained medics or 
nurses. The result of this was that; 'Medical assistants and practitioners full of 
ignorance form the majority of a medical corps which has inflicted worse 
wounds on our troops than enemy bullets have!'.111 
Returning to his firm belief in the benefits of investing in an efficient 
educational programme, he reminded his audience that: 'Ignorance in this art 
has always figured in our catalogue of plagues'.112 As the funds spent on the 
Medical Corps were limited, fully-trained medics preferred to make a living 
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110 Tornel, Memoria... 1835, p. 29. 
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outside the military profession not only because they were better-off as civilians 
but also because there was no incentive for them to abandon their 'comforts to 
follow the departing troops and to participate in their dangers'.113 
Tornel's plans to regenerate the Medical Corps were, however well-
intentioned, limited in their effectiveness. Whilst he had insisted that education 
needed funds urgently and went on to demand them, in the case of the Medical 
Corps he was more prepared to accept that the severe economic crisis Mexico 
was undergoing meant that its economy could not be further taxed at present 
and, therefore, little could be done other than voice his concern and distress. He 
succeeded in obtaining an increase of 46,000 pesos on the budget of 1833, but 
admitted that this was 'a very small increase if one considers those 
improvements which our corps and hospitals need'.114 Essentially, all he 
claimed he could do, at the time, was to promise to allocate whatever funds 
might be necessary to regenerate the Medical Corps whenever they were made 
available: 'The government abstains for the time being, albeit with regret, from 
adopting the aforementioned project, because it requires funds which cannot be 
obtained without further crippling our treasury'.115 
Faithful to his promise, however, a year and a half later, on 6 August, the 
Cuerpo de Sanidad Militar was formed, 'with the aim of providing hospitals 
and troops with medical assistants'.116 Tornel actually succeeded in creating a 
corps which consisted of one director general, two inspectors, a director in 
charge of each hospital, with a surgeon allocated to each corps of the permanent 
and active militia, and with 'the respective medical assistants, to work in regular 
hospitals as well as in blood hospitals'.117 If in 1835 the Medical Corps could 
not rely on an adequate number of competent medical and nursing staff to serve 
their provisional and permanent hospitals, by 1839, 'both kinds have been 
generally provided for; the majority of corps have medical assistants now and 
for the troops the necessary number of practitioners has been supplied'.118 
Furthermore, those who had chosen to follow a medical career in the army 
had not abandoned their corps on becoming qualified doctors or surgeons. In 
spite of the 'renowned dire straits of the treasury', he claimed that their newly-
trained medics had at last been rewarded. The government had succeeded in 
providing them with 'general and particular power for each class, their 
corresponding privileges and the right to a pension'. Moreover, in the existing 
hospitals they had found the resources to provide the 'wages of the employed 
medical assistants and domestic staff . At the time, on 7 January 1839, this was 
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the one part of his report with which he could allow himself to be, to a great 
extent, satisfied. What in 1835 might have been received as a politician's empty 
promise was by 1839 a project which had been fulfilled in more ways than one. 
If there was one thing which he considered could produce 'the most healthy 
effect on the good of humanity and specifically on that of the worthy troops' at 
such a time of war and turmoil it was definitely the Cuerpo de Sanidad 
Militar.119 
Therefore, it is ironic that in his 1844 report, when in almost every other 
field Tornel could be described as satisfied (even complacent), and when he had 
been in charge of the Ministry of War for three years, the one area which had 
suffered greatly since 1839 was the Medical Corps. When in 1839, at a time of 
crisis, he had been able to produce a very satisfactory report on the reforms 
which had revitalised it, in 1844, when there had been the time and the 
continuity to allow such reforms to flourish, the opposite had been the case: 
All the attempts and efforts of the legislator and the government to 
reform this corps have by one fault or another come to nothing, and our 
soldier continues to lack that necessary assistance during campaigns 
which he deserves so much as he sheds his blood in defence of the 
nation.120 
He offered no explanation. His concern was expressed in the same usual 
terms of disappointment and disgust, and he reiterated the need to rescue this 
all-important and tragically neglected corps. He stated that the government had 
succeeded in establishing the law of 6 August 1836 once more, as it had been 
cancelled on 25 February 1843, and hoped that this would help the Medical 
Corps to recover from its temporary oblivion. 
Although he deplored the abandon the Medical Corps had been subjected to, 
it must be stated that there were working hospitals where there had not been any 
only ten years before.121 Where this neglect needed to be overcome with a 
certain degree of urgency was out in the desert lands of the north. Those 
soldiers who were wounded in the constant skirmishes which took place against 
the Comanche and the Apache had to be attended by any nearby settlers. The 
divisions which departed to face the hardships of a campaign were still in 
desperate need of doctors and nurses who were prepared to go with them. 
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121 In 1844 there were working military hospitals in Veracruz, Tampico, San Luis 
Potosi, Chihuahua, Matamoros, Tabasco, Perote, Acapulco, Guadalajara, Jalapa, the 
Hospital General de San Andres in Mexico City, and there were three provisional 
hospitals in Mazatlan, Bravos and Chilapa. 
Tornel emphasised the extent to which this problem had to be addressed by 
Congress: 
This is an evil which requires an immediate and effective remedy, 
because it is painful and a matter of concern to the troops who suffer the 
fatigues and hardships of service, that they lack the adequate assistance. 
Specifically in the case of those divisions who march to fight in 
campaign it is fundamental that they are provided with a cohort from 
the Medical Corps, with the adequate number of surgeons, first aid kits 
and all the necessary medical utensils to ensure that our troops can be 
cured.122 
The root of all this evil, according to Tornel, was the same as it had been in 
1835 - the lack of funds. In Mexico City's General Hospital patients were not 
being attended adequately because the doctors were not being paid with 
consistency. There was a very damaging moratorium in the payment of their 
wages. Tornel hoped that by handing the doctors' wages over to the Director of 
the Medical Corps to give to them on his obligatory daily round of visits, further 
bureaucratic delays could be avoided, thus making their pay readily available. 
If improving the education and the health care of the regular army were two 
key reformist concerns of the military elite, so was the actual social composition 
of the troops. In a way, specifically in terms of who made up the regular army, 
there were two almost incompatible aims which were shared by most of the 
Ministers of War of this period; the first was that the army needed to be large, 
and the second was that its men needed to be recruited from the more educated 
sectors of society. 
As Cambas rightly points out, Tornel 'always believed in having a large 
army'.123 In 1835 he opened his ministerial report with a long exposition on the 
need to have a well-kept army.124 He challenged the liberal view, which 
appeared soon after independence was achieved, which argued that it was a 
contradiction to be a free country and to have a regular army.125 He agreed that 
122 Tornel, Memoria... J844, p. 63. 
123 M.R. Cambas, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna (Mexico, 1958), pp. 200-1. 
124 This exposition, entitled 'Necesidad del ejercito', was reprinted with an 
introduction, in a beautifully bound commemorative book which can be found in the 
Edmundo O'Gorman Collection at the Nettie Lee Benson Library, University of Texas, 
Austin: Ejercito Mexicano. Memoria sobre la organization que se did al Ejercito 
Mexicano, y que se dedica al Excmo. Sr. Benemerito de la Patria, General de Division 
Presidente de la Republica Mexicana D. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, constante 
defensor de sus companeros de armas (Mexico, 1853). 
125 For a further discussion on the liberal-conservative divide over the need for a 
regular army instead of a militia see J. Z. Vazquez, 'Iglesia, Ejercito y Centralismo', 
Historia Mexicana, vol. XXXIX, no.l (Mexico, 1989), p. 210. 
war was clearly a despicable evil which humanity had to contend with, and that 
ideally, in a world in which such horrors could be avoided, armies would then 
no longer be necessary. However: 
if evil exists, if men cannot find a way to ensure that everybody is fair, 
respecting each other's rights, then it cannot be denied that to repel a 
force it is fundamental that another force is created. Defence is a natural 
and justifiable right of nations in the same way that it is of individuals. 
To order and to regulate this defence is not only a question of prudence, 
it is a necessity.126 
These considerations appeared fourteen years after the war of independence 
had ended; fourteen years in which all the conflicts which had taken place with 
the exception of the Barradas expedition of 1829, had been the direct result of 
military interventions and uprisings. Although Tornel insisted that 'our army is 
the organised defence of a nation' it was clear from the experience of the past 
few years that it had been that very same army which had been responsible for 
most of the wars and conflicts which the country had witnessed since it had 
become independent. Tornel refuted this fact with the significant allegation that 
the army had not been the prepetrator but the victim of these internal turmoils: 
'those very ones who are probably the true instigators of the disasters our nation 
has suffered in so many upheavals, claim that the army, which has been either 
the victim or the unwilling instrument, in all of these events, has been 
responsible for these casualties'.127 In other words, displaying an early version 
of the antipolitics which will be discussed further on, he blamed the factions and 
the parties, the civilian politicians, and cleared the army of all blame. It must be 
noted that the way he always protected the values and the rights of the military 
would clearly contribute towards guaranteeing him and Santa Anna their 
support time and again. 
He stressed that of all their institutions it was the army they were indebted 
to: 'The Mexican army conquered independence; the nation owes its freedom to 
its efforts; and the federation was proclaimed and established by the army'. 
Therefore, it was fundamental, in order to consolidate peace and harmony in the 
republic, to ensure that the army was not alienated from society. This was a 
direct allusion to the reforms which Gomez Farias's liberal administration had 
started to impose, limiting the privileges of the army as well as the clergy, and 
which had eventually provoked the Plan of Cuernavaca which Tornel himself 
had drafted and orchestrated in 1834.128 The army, as well as being necessary, 
126 Tornel, Memoria... 1835, p. 3. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Tornel played a main role in organising the long list of pronunciamientos which 
needed to be well-kept and the military needed to be treated as a respected and 
integral part of society: 'to separate the soldiers from the interests of society is 
to fight society; it means to turn into enemies those who are awarded a 
privileged condition so that they can better serve society'.129 If the army had as 
its main purpose to protect the integrity of the nation and to preserve society as 
it was versus the threat of the forces of anarchy, it was foolish to criticise and to 
attack it. Without the army, 'society would have been dissolved, property would 
not have been protected, roads would not have been used except by bandits'. 
Therefore, in Tornel's mind, the need for an army stemmed from the notion that 
it was fundamental to the safe-keeping of society as it had developed after 
independence. The army deserved to retain its privileged condition because it 
was the sole force which could protect the properties of the landowning and 
propriety classes from the ever-present threat of banditry and social unrest. 
The other reason Tornel offered to justify his belief in maintaining a large 
regular army was the fact that Mexico had to contend with the dangers of 
foreign ambition. He reminded Congress of the proximity of Cuba, of the 
Arenas Conspiracy of 1827 and the Barradas expedition of 1829. Although after 
Ferdinand VII had died there was the possibility that relations between Spain 
and Mexico could change for the better, a renewed attempt to re-conquer 
Mexico was not out of the question. Given that it was likely that Mexico might 
have to confront a foreign invader, not to have a regular army would be a recipe 
for disaster. An untrained popular army made up of volunteers on the spur of 
the moment could never defend a country adequately: 
When the people rise en masse to fight a war against a foreign invader 
or a domestic tyrant, all of their labours are abandoned, labours which 
constitute a true wealth of a nation, which provide it with its 
subsistence. Hoards of shapeless masses with no guns or discipline do 
not have either caution, confidence or a sense of subordination to the 
leaders who are unfortunately destined to command them.130 
On the one hand, the land would be deserted by this method of emergency 
recruitment leaving the country without an adequate means of sustaining itself 
financially as well as in terms of having a means of feeding its people. On the 
other hand, these improvised troops, having had no military training, would not 
know how to obey their superiors' orders. When the actual battle began and it 
was essential that the troops could immediately act on demand, aware of 
strategy and war tactics, their complete ignorance in military matters would 
inevitably lead to chaos and defeat. Therefore, having established that Mexico 
followed the Plan of Cuernavaca. To quote Cambas: 'El Plan tuvo por jefe aparente al 
general D. Angel Perez Palacios, pero en realidad fue dirigido por D. Jose Maria Tornel.' 
Cambas, Santa Anna, p. 30. 
129 Tornel, Memoria... 1835, p. 3. 
130 Ibid., p. 5. 
needed a large and regular professional army, he focused on two aspects which 
were clearly related to the means of achieving this; one was the system of 
recruitment and the other was the control of desertions. 
In his opinion the system of recruitment was catastrophic as it was practised 
at the time because it sent criminals and leperos into the army as a form of 
punishment, and there was no consistency in it. The consequence of this was 
that on the one hand the army had become one of bandits and assassins nobody 
would want to entrust with the defence of the nation, and on the other hand, 
because of the lack of a regular system of recruitment, it was also afflicted with 
the problems of having men of all ages and occupations who either could not 
possibly survive a day's combat or whose talents were being wasted having 
been taken away from their valuable professions in civilian society through 
arbitrary and forced levies. Faced with this scenario desertions were quite 
understandably a probability; those who had decent professions were propelled 
to leave by a sense of injustice; the criminals chose to escape taking with them a 
free source of supplies, only to become even more dangerous and successful as 
bandits on Mexico's highways. 
The reforms Tornel proposed in 1835 were certainly enlightened in 
comparison with the way soldiers were being recruited at the time. He proposed 
the enforcement of military service. It would be carried out by all men with the 
exception of 'the physically impaired, and those individuals whose professions 
or jobs are more useful to the nation in postings which lie outside the military 
profession'. 
Moreover, he stated that the military service would have to have a time 
limit. It could not last indefinitely as had been the case until then, inspiring 
many to desert. It was logical that as it would now be a service which the 
majority of men would have to carry out, the period of time each individual 
would have to serve would be the minimum: 'the law must lay out that by 
affecting a larger number of men, the service will be all the lighter and more 
tolerable'. 
To avoid arbitrary decisions and personal feuds this new method of 
recruitment was to be effected with a form of lottery. Each year it was to be the 
duty of the local authorities to recruit the adequate number of soldiers, taking 
into consideration the population size of the community in question, by drawing 
lots, starting with men who were between 18 and 22 years of age, and moving 
on to the 23 to 26 age group if there were not enough men in the first group.131 
131 This was a major innovation considering that until then men of all ages could 
find themselves being recruited, when they had businesses to run and families to 
maintain. Tornel was very clear in stating that this was to be avoided in future: 'Asi no 
Eight days were to be allocated for these men to check whether their names had 
been drawn, during which they could make any appeals for exemption if they 
believed they were unfit to do the military service for medical or other reasons. 
Those who had no address or property did not participate in this lottery and 
were to be sent to serve the coasts and the frontier posts, and were to be used, 
although this was not expressed, as cannon fodder.132 
Tornel's new system of recruitment supplied the army with a constant large 
number of men. Ideally it pleased the generals who had seen their troops 
reduced by the law of 16 November 1833; it pleased the nation, granting it an 
army which was not exclusively made up of criminals and which would be 
disciplined thanks to its regularisation and training; and it pleased the working 
population as it only took men away from home for a maximum period of two 
years and from a limited age group. The large Indian population who had no 
property and no choice in the matter did not benefit from Tornel's proposal; but 
then, for Tornel and his class, they did not really count as people. 
Regarding the recurrent problem of desertions that the army was plagued 
with, Tornel hoped that these reforms would at least reduce to a considerable 
extent those cases in which the motivation for leaving the army was based on 
the previous arbitrary process of selection and the fact that service could go on 
interminably without any consideration given to the individual's age or 
marital/professional background. However, to ensure that desertion was 
controlled, in his 1835 proposals, he advocated sending those deserters who 
were caught to frontier posts. He also recommended this same destination for 
criminals. It was important that the army be made up of 'useful and principled 
people'.133 
However, Tornel's plans were not fully implemented in the years following 
his proposal due to the internal conflicts and the wars which erupted almost 
immediately after the publication of his report. The Texan campaign as well as 
the French Pastry War were important factors in determining that these reforms 
were not properly implemented. In 1839, Tornel lamented that 'The 1835 
administration dedicated itself constantly to achieving the resurrection of the 
army; however, its work could not be perfect because the corps it created one 
day had gone to fight the enemy on the next'.134 He argued that they had not had 
estaran los hombres amenazados siempre de ser soldados, podrian contraer matrimonios 
que tan utiles son a la sociedad, y dedicarse a alguna profesion util que pueda ser la 
ocupacion de toda su vida'. 
132 T h e misery of the Indians increased in time of war because their men were used 
as cannon fodder'. Olivera and Crete, Life in Mexico, p. 162. The whole chapter, 
'Mexicans at War' (pp. 159-80) offers a fascinating insight into the conditions soldiers 
lived in at the time. 
133 Tornel, Memoria... 1835, p. 15. 
134 Tornel, Memoria... 1839, p. 12. 
the time to implement the reforms adequately. Given a long period of peace and 
political stability he was convinced that the Mexican army would be more than 
ready to go to war: 'A long period of peace would result in the establishment of 
an army which was worthy of its objectives, and the most suited to ensure the 
progress and stability of wishes that may be deemed to be the true pleasure of 
the people'.135 What he considered to be the most tragic aspect of the lamentable 
situation the army was in at that time, was that his reforms had not been given 
the opportunity to prosper because of the constant civil and internal wars which 
had divided Mexico: 'Internal divisions destroy and rock even those 
establishments which seem to be the most solid ones'. The conclusion was an 
obvious one: 'in order that an army which is useful in war is organised, it is 
fundamental that it be formed in times of peace and stability'.136 
In January 1839, at war on two fronts, the main priority was to crush Urrea 
and Mejia's rebellion and to repulse the French offensive. Considerations as to 
how recruitment could be improved were secondary to the actual endeavour of 
winning both wars. Therefore, rather than obey laws which had been legislated 
during a time of peace, it was important for them to adapt to the present context 
and act accordingly without allowing previous theories to obstruct their actions. 
Therefore, although there were allegedly 32,442 men recruited under the terms 
which had been passed in 1835, the present emergency demanded an urgent 
increase in the number of soldiers to ensure a Mexican victory. As has been 
noted, according to Tornel, they needed to be able to create in a question of 
hours a temporary army of civilians in case the French launched another 
offensive and proceeded to move inland. In order to achieve this he created an 
emergency corps of urban militias and gave them the name of defensores de la 
patria. He estimated that now, 'in a month fifty thousand men from the urban 
militias can be called to arms' if such a measure became necessary. These urban 
militias were to be made up of civilians of all ages who were to be given a basic 
military instruction so that they could provide an effective defence versus any 
foreign invaders. However, their military contribution would only be necessary 
in times of war. In peace time these civilians could go back to their everyday 
activities without further ado. In other words, the defensores de la patria were 
simply civilians who had been drilled to be able to survive a military attack and 
combat it if such an event ocurred. Although this latter appendage to Tornel's 
reforms in recruitment contradicted in essence his belief in maintaining one 
permanent regular and disciplined force, he had no qualms in embracing it if it 
meant repelling the French: 'When forces are organised according to the rules, 
the results are all the more important and fewer sacrifices are needed; however, 
if all of our efforts are necessary to win this ignoble war which the French have 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., p. 16. 
provoked, then the whole nation will be armed'.137 
In January 1844 the situation was very different. As has been noted, Tornel 
had been responsible for the Ministry of War since October 1841, and although 
there had been internal wars in Yucatan, Sonora and the South of Mexico, and 
the campaign in Texas was still consuming lives and forces, compared to the 
previous decade these had been three years of relative peace. Tornel's 
ministerial report of 1844 clearly reflects this. To begin with he could afford the 
time to look back and refer his audience in Congress to the report he had 
delivered in 1835: 'It was ten years ago now, that standing in this august 
building, reading another report, I insisted on proving the need for an army'. He 
remained convinced of this need. Moreover, he claimed that had there not been 
'a more or less organised force' Mexico would have disintegrated either from 
its internal conflicts or from the French intervention. He was full of praise for 
the army: 
in spite of the fact that it has not yet been possible to raise it to a state of 
absolute perfection, due to the continuous civil conflicts, it has been 
loyal to its mother-country, it has gone to look for its enemies in remote 
and deserted frontiers, it has marched to the extremes of the Republic, 
and it is always ready to expose itself to danger.138 
After three years of relative peace in which his system of recruitment had 
been given time to develop, certain results were clearly visible, albeit not to the 
extent that would have been expected. In the infantry there was a total of 20,700 
men - in other words, 8,378 more than there were in October 1841. In the 
cavalry there was a total of 8,693 men, 3,663 more than in 1841. Although he 
was hoping to have an infantry of 52,983 men and a cavalry of 19,940 men, he 
was pleased to see the increases which had come about during his time in office. 
However, many of the problems he had hoped to cure with his 1835 reforms 
remained unresolved. His lottery system of recruitment, 'the most liberal and 
republican system', was not working as he had intended it to: 'the lottery finds 
in the Mexican Republic a constant and open opposition, which has not been 
appeased either by the philosophy of its legislators or by the active efforts of the 
governments'.139 The major problem was that the local authorities continued to 
accept the appeals for exemption of those 'useful and hardworking men' they 
were aquainted with and with whom they sympathised, exempting them from 
doing their military service. On the other hand, they continued to send the 
'beggars, depraved individuals and criminals' to swell the ranks of an army 
which was meant to be made up of all of Mexico's sons. Tornel exclaimed, 
'How can we expect the Mexican army to be a paragon of virtue and morality 
137 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
138 Tornel, Memoria... 1844, p. 60. 
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when it is formed of the scum of the people?!' It is clear that desertion remained 
as much of a problem as it had been in 1835. Tornel asked the local authorities 
to recruit 'good citizens' and to prevent criminals from infecting the army, 
giving them the 'prostituted title of defenders'.140 What was apparent was that in 
war or in peace the system of recruitment Tornel had designed in 1835 was still 
not working in 1844. In brief, Tornel, like all of the Ministers of War, as will be 
seen further on, wanted the army to be made up of the sons of the hombres de 
bien, and the sons of the hombres de bien, for obvious reasons, did not want to 
lose two years of their lives suffering in some squalid barrack. 
Waddy Thomson's recollections of the Mexican army in 1843 are certainly 
worth noting here, even when they are tainted with the partiality which would 
be expected from a minister plenipotentiary of the United States who actually 
promoted the annexation of the entire country. In terms of discipline, he 
believed that 'The inequality between disciplined and undisciplined troops is 
estimated by military men as one to five',141 making a mockery of Tornel's 
attempts to enforce discipline and instruction in all regular soldiers. Regarding 
the system of recruitment as it was practised in reality rather than as Tornel had 
intended it to be: 
The soldiers of the Mexican army are generally collected by sending out 
recruiting detachments into the mountains, where they hunt the Indians 
in their dens and caverns, and bring them in chains to Mexico; there is 
scarcely a day that droves of these miserable and more than half naked 
wretches are not seen thus chained together and marching through the 
streets to the barracks, where they are scoured and then dressed in a 
uniform made of linen cloth or of serge, and are occasionally drilled.142 
Desertions were to continue into the next two decades in such a way that it 
comes as no surprise that Ignacio Altamirano's novel El Zarco, one of the best 
exponents of the nineteenth century novel in Mexico, was precisely about an 
army of deserters, los plateados: 
(who) had organised themselves into parties of a hundred, two hundred 
and even five hundred men (...), who roamed the province, living off 
the land, imposing high taxes on the haciendas and the villages, 
establishing tolls in the roads and practising kidnaps every day; in other 
words, the kidnapping of people they did not release unless they 
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received a very large ransom.143 
In the words of Olivera and Crete, 'Discipline was poor: desertion 
commonplace'.144 
In fact, Tornel's failure, like that of the other Ministers of War, was 
highlighted when war broke out with the United States in 1846. It could have 
been presumed, taking into account his intentions and the results they were 
meant to achieve, that after approximately nine years of active involvement in 
the Ministry of War, the outcome of the war would have been different. 
Regardless of the increased numbers of soldiers of the emergency militias, of 
the constant endeavours to drill, train and prepare Mexico's soldiers and 
civilians for war, in 1847, General Winfield Scott and his comparatively small 
army succeeded in defeating 
the whole Mexican army of (at the beginning) thirty-odd thousand men 
- posted, always, on chosen positions, behind entrenchments, or more 
formidable defenses of nature and art; killed or wounded, of that 
number, more than 7,000 officers and men; taken 3,730 prisoners, one 
seventh officers, including 13 generals, of whom 3 had been presidents 
of this republic; captured more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces 
of ordinance, besides 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, and immense 
quantity of shots, shells, powder, etc.145 
Even then, Tornel was to return to assume the post of Minister of War once 
more in 1853. Needless to say, as will be discussed now, the success of 
santanismo, as a political ideology, paired with its strong committment to 
defending the regular army's institutional interests, was key, not only to General 
Santa Anna's repeated rise to power, and by default, Tornel's own successful 
career, but also to the emergence of a corporate military identity amongst the 
high ranking officers of the period. 
Santanismo : An Early Exponent of Antipolitics 
Recent research, notably into the works of the main ideologue of the 
santanistas, General Jose Maria Tornel, has shown that the santanistas were not 
necessarily a group of unprincipled opportunists, but that, in fact, they belonged 
to a clique, faction or party which represented an ideology in its own right. 
Santanismo offered a republican system which was seen to represent boldly and 
effectively the main interests of the elite, regardless of whether its individual 
members subscribed to the liberal, the moderate or the traditionalist-
143 I.M. Altamirano, El Zarco (Mexico, 1984), p. 5. 
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conservative cause.146 This was particularly important at a time when the 
differences between liberals and conservatives were not as significant as 
Alaman and Mora portrayed them, and when, at the end of the day, notions such 
as law and order and the defence of the hegemony of the hombres de bien were 
far more important to the Creole oligarchy which had achieved political power 
with independence than any strict ideological definitions. Once this 
interpretation is adopted it becomes evident that the many changes that were 
carried out by the politicians of the period were clearly not as dramatic as they 
have been made out to be. In the words of Charles Hale, 'Social assumptions 
ran deeper than the liberal-conservative conflict'.147 As Costeloe has also noted, 
for the typical hombre de bien, 'his political views were not significant in the 
social environment in which he moved, and in any case his opinions were likely 
to be fluid, changing to some extent in accordance with experience and the 
prevailing circumstances'.148 
However, even then, the elite in Mexico was unable to find the kind of 
political consensus which its counterpart in Chile succeeded in establishing. 
Factionalism, masonic rivalries, personality clashes and strong regional tensions 
all contributed to preventing the Creole oligarchy from consolidating the stable 
government which Diego Portales was able to create in Chile. It is specifically 
in this context of bitterly opposed cliques, who, with the help or inspiration of 
certain individual high ranking officers, used force to oust each other from 
power, that santanismo, unlike liberalism or conservatism, emerged as the 
ideology of an antipolitical and patriotic professional army. 
It is evident from Santa Anna's memoirs that he disliked the actual burden 
of governing Mexico. He allegedly prefered 'the sweet aspects of family life, 
with no other distraction than my own affairs',149 at first, in his hacienda of 
Manga de Clavo, and later in El Encero, Veracruz. However, according to his 
own account of events, he was asked to intervene time and again, and, for the 
sake of the nation, la patria, he sacrificed his quiet retirement and led the army 
whether it was against foreign invaders or a 'despotic' government, because it 
was his duty. The following lines from his memoirs illustrate this point clearly: 
'I believed that it was my honour to lead the avant-garde of the defenders of the 
Mexican nation'; 'I could not be indifferent to the pleas of my fellow-
countrymen'; 'with a love of the Patria deeply engraved in my heart since I 
146 See W. Fowler, 'Dreams of Stability'. 
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22. 
was of the tenderest age (...) I ran frantically to the place of combat'; 'My voice 
would then be confused with the roar of the canons: there where it was 
imperative to defy death, for her, there was I (...) My mother-country has 
always been my idol; and her soldiers, my brothers'.150 
At a time when the concept of nationhood was as yet unclear and when 
many Mexicans felt that they owed their loyalty more to their province or 
region rather than to the new and abstract concept of Mexico as a one and 
indivisible mother-country,151 Santa Anna's patriotic rhetoric was probably not 
as appealing to the troops as he believed it to be. However, it can be presumed 
that it had a certain resonance among the high ranking officers who belonged to 
the generation which had embraced the cause of independence in 1821. If in 
France in the post-Napoleonic years memory became militarised with the 
romanticisation of the past war experience,152 in Mexico there was a similar 
idealisation of the war of independence which inevitably paid tribute to the 
patriotism of the military. As can be seen in the annual ministerial reports of the 
Ministry of War throughout the period, the Chambers of Deputies and Senators 
were reminded time and again that they owed their independence to the army. 
To quote only a few examples: Gomez Pedraza, in 1827, stated that, 'the army, 
virtuous and organised (...), with all its glory, had made independence 
possible';153 Facio, in 1830, further argued that 'It is to the army (...) without a 
doubt, that the nation owes its independence';154 likewise, Tornel, in 1835, 
expressed the belief that 'The Mexican army won independence: the nation 
owes its freedom to (the army's) endeavours';155 and General Pedro Garcia 
Conde (Minister of War 1844-45), in 1845, reiterated the view that 'there is no 
doubt, gentlemen, that the army accomplished (our) national independence'.156 
If there was not a consciousness of patriotism among the troops, there was one 
among the high ranking officers. In the same way that they congratulated 
themselves on being the authors of independence, they also prided themselves 
on being the one institution which could safeguard Mexico's national integrity 
against any form of foreign aggression. In the midst of this romantic notion that 
the officers belonged to a privileged elite which had been responsible for the 
present existence of their Patria, Santa Anna's particular rhetoric was effective. 
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However, what is more significant is that he was able to turn this notion of 
patriotic responsibility into one of political responsibility; one which had as its 
premise that the army did not belong to the factionalist and divided world of the 
civilian politicians. The army was above politics.The claim was that the army's 
sole concern was Mexico as opposed to the political success of one faction or 
another. Santa Anna's 'farewell' speech of December 1838, after he had been 
badly wounded in the leg fighting the French, is particularly relevant to this 
point. First, he depicted himself as having sacrificed his life to defend Mexico's 
sacred integrity against the French aggressors: 'I was wounded in this last effort 
and probably this will be the last victory that I shall offer my native land'. 
Second, he conveyed the notion that he was detached, far-removed from the 
divisions inherent in party politics; like a benevolent father-figure he was glad 
that as he died there might be an end to the disruption for which such factions 
were responsible: 'On closing my career, I cannot refrain from expressing my 
joy at seeing the beginning of reconciliation among the Mexican factions'. And 
finally, he appealed to his audience's emotions, their patriotic and nationalistic 
sentiments in particular: 'May all Mexicans, forgetting my political mistakes, 
not deny me the only title which I wish to leave my children: that of a 'good 
Mexican'.157 There is no doubt that his bold action in Veracruz against the 
French, together with these patriotic words, had an impressive effect on the high 
ranking officers. The same man who only two years earlier had been 
responsible for the disastrous defeat at San Jacinto, who had gone on to be taken 
prisoner by the Texan rebels, and who had allegedly agreed unpatriotically to 
sell Texas for a large sum of money, suddenly found that all was forgiven as a 
direct result of his valour and the successful way in which he portrayed himself 
as a man detached from the pettiness of factional political squabbling. 
Incredible as it may seem, Santa Anna was President of the Republic again in 
1839.158 
This belief, upheld by high ranking officers, that they were above or outside 
party politics, in what has been defined as antipolitics, was one of the 
immediate results of early military professionalisation in the Hispanic world. In 
Spain, for instance, one of the military bulletins argued in 1841 that 'We cannot 
and will not say "we are the state", but we do say, "We are the nation", or if you 
prefer, "the most pure part of the nation'".159 In cynical terms, this detachment 
from civilian politics or pose of non-alignment with any of the parties, allowed 
those generals who were praetorian predators to intervene whenever they 
thought fit, arguing that they were doing so for the sake of the nation. In the 
157 The translation of Santa Anna's speech is taken from W.H. Callcott, Santa Anna: 
The Story of an Enigma Who Once Was Mexico (Connecticut, 1964), p. 159. 
158 He was asked to serve as Interim President, whilst Anastasio Bustamante left 
Mexico City to crush General Urrea's revolt, from 20 March to 10 July 1839. 
159 Payne, Ejercito y Sociedad en la Espaha Liberal, p. 41. 
case of Santa Anna, Lynch has argued that it was specifically because he did not 
align himself with one party or another that he became the 'temptation of all the 
parties'.160 Thus, the Liberals asked him to intervene for their cause in 1832 and 
in 1846, and the Conservatives did the same in 1853. 
Although the concept of antipolitics does not provide a definition of the 
political ideology of the regular army, it does help to account in part for Santa 
Anna's appeal to the military. There was a curious romantic dignity for 
professional officers in adopting this stance of political detachment, or even 
political superiority. Like an idealised Royal Family of the past, the military 
were above party politics. They intervened as an arbitrating force when civilian 
politicians reached a dead end, without, in theory, becoming sullied in the 
bickering inherent in constitutional debate. What is more, officers were justified 
in being proud as it had been thanks to them that independence had been 
achieved. Like Santa Anna, who was clearly the most popular general of the 
period, the army, associated with him, represented the patria, or, to echo the 
view of the Spanish officers, the 'parte mas pura de la patria'. 
Evidently, once the army is seen to have been mainly supportive of Santa 
Anna throughout most of the period, a political definition can be found. Given 
that the santanistas did sustain a political ideology, and that Tornel was the 
main ideologue of Santa Anna's supporters, it is in his annual ministerial 
reports as Minister of War that an idea of the nature of the beliefs which were 
most representative of the high ranking officers can be discovered. 
Tornel believed that the army was not a passive or indeed isolated 
institution, its history, its story, was that of the country: 'its history is that of the 
politics of the nation to which it belongs'.161 Tornel's views on the army were a 
reflection of his views on politics and society. What he attempted to achieve as 
Minister of War within the army in 1833, from 1835-37, from 1838-39, from 
1841-44, in 1846 and in 1853, was not disimilar from what he hoped to achieve 
in society. In summarising the essence of his reforms and demands throughout 
his career in the Ministry of War, the following points can be seen to emerge. 
Tornel wanted Mexico to have: 
(i) a large army made up of honourable hard working young men, i.e. 
members of the middle class; 
(ii) an army with fully qualified doctors and engineers who would 
contribute in assisting the civilian community with good hospitals and 
modern roadworks; 
(iii) an army with educated and literate troops, instructed through the 
Lancasterian method of teaching; 
(iv) an army in which prizes, awards and promotions would only be given 
160 Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, p. 334. 
161 Tornel, Memoria (...) 1844, p. 2. 
for outstanding acts of valour against a foreign enemy, and not for 
supporting a successful pronunciamiento;162 
(v) an army with an effective system of pensions for the widows and 
orphans of the dead; 
(vi) a large and civilised army which would have as its main priority to 
maintain law and order in Mexico and to protect its national integrity. 
These ideals were respected by the most influential core of the army. What is 
more, they can almost all be found consistently in the majority of the annual 
ministerial reports of the Ministry of War of the period. 
The following quotes exemplify what the different Ministers of War thought 
about the social background of the people who constituted the rank and file of 
the army, and what they hoped would be the social background of the troops in 
an ideal world. In 1826, Gomez Pedraza lamented, for instance, that the army 
was made up of 'idle men, with no address or home, the result of which is that 
the army (...) will become but a gang of villains, or at least of people without 
patriotism or honour'.163 Herrera, in 1834, reiterated this point in stating that 
'the worst kind of people are sent by the communities to serve (the army)'.164 
Almonte, in 1840, argued that it was fundamental for the army to ensure that 
'the corps are made up of useful people'.165 Arista, in 1849, was persuaded that 
in his drastically reduced regular army there was 'hope that the army may be 
made up of chosen people'.166 However, Robles, in 1852, arrived at the 
162 Tornel condemned in each one of his Memorias de Guerra all promotions and 
prizes which had been given based on the soldier's questionable merits in fighting his 
own countrymen. In fact, in 1835, he argued that it was the obligation of all republican 
governments to prevent the creation of '6rdenes militares que formen en el estado un 
nuevo cuerpo privilegiado', warning Congress that 'la aristocracia militar es la mas 
peligrosa' (p. 16). However, whilst in theory he clearly believed that awarding 
promotions to those soldiers who joined a successful revolt was detrimental to any sense 
of discipline and morality the army might have, it is clear from the historical data 
available that Tornel had no qualms in awarding prizes and promotions to all those high-
ranking officers who participated in the rebellions he himself organised or participated 
in. See my 'Jose Maria Tornel', pp. 156-8. Again, this view was expressed in most of the 
annual ministerial reports of the period. Facio went as far as stating in his 1830 Memoria 
that, 'La distribution de grados que se prodigo con asombro, origino igualmente el poco 
aprecio y minoro el entusiasmo; (...) viendose desde entonces divisas militares de todas 
clases portadas por muchos hombres sin merito y sin virtudes' (p. 7). 
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conclusion that the pay in the army was not enough to attract 'that section of the 
population which would be the most suited to carry out the military service'.167 
In brief, there was a consensus among those generals who became Ministers of 
War throughout the period that the army needed to be made up of members of 
the middle classes. The sub-class which in fact made up the rank and file of the 
army, levied by force from Indian communities outside the main cities and 
marched into the garrisons in chain gangs,168 was clearly one which they hoped 
to eradicate from their regiments. After all, the desertion rate was extremely 
high as a result of the kind of people who were levied. 
Like Tornel they all embraced the belief that there was a need for good 
doctors and engineers, and similarly advocated installing an effective 
educational system. In a similar vein, there was a consistant philanthropic 
demand for pensions, and most of them agreed that the proliferation of 
promotions which had followed Iturbide's rise to power had been damaging to 
the discipline of the army. After all, as the US Minister Plenipotentiary Waddy 
Thompson noted in 1846, 'They have more than two hundred generals, most of 
them without commands'.169 Evidently, they all believed that it was the army's 
duty to ensure that law and order was enforced in Mexico. 
If, following Tornel's view that the ideal army was the reflection of an ideal 
society, these beliefs are translated into a political interpretation of the kind of 
system high ranking officers wanted for Mexico, the following conclusions can 
be obtained. In essence, the majority of generals who acted as Ministers of War 
believed that their society needed to be regimented, disciplined and hierarchical. 
They clearly inherited the philanthropic beliefs of the enlightenment in 
providing Mexico with a basic education. Similarly, for people of their own 
class, in the tradition of the Masonic lodges, they hoped to provide pensions for 
those in need and a reliable medical service. Faced with the external pressures 
of industrialisation they favoured the existence of well-qualified engineers. 
However, the most significant belief which was shared by liberal, moderate, 
santanista and traditionalist generals was the one regarding the constitution of 
the army in terms of social class. Echoing Paredes y Arrillaga's conviction that 
the proletariat had to be kept outside the political debate, most generals wanted 
the army and society to be made up of people who belonged to the middle and 
upper classes. In this sense, their views paralleled those of the hombres de bien, 
the gente decente, who, including moderate liberals such as Mora, and 
conservatives such as Alaman, were convinced that the right to vote had to be 
restricted to property-owning citizens. This suggests that the high ranking 
officers were, in their majority, traditionalist/conservative in their political 
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values and, if not conservative, santanista. Given that most of the moderates 
were santanistas at one point or another, as santanismo was essentially an 
amalgam of those views which traditionalists and liberals shared in common, 
and that high ranking officers together with the hombres de bien welcomed 
more often than not the repeated rise of Santa Anna and Tornel's management 
of the army, it is possible to claim that the high ranking officers of the regular 
army represented, to a certain extent as an estate or a class, those political 
beliefs which were upheld by the traditionalist and the moderate/santanista 
cliques of the early national period. Evidence of this can be found in an analyis 
of the views which were expounded by the Ministers of War. 
The Beliefs of the Ministers of War (1822-53) 
Of the Ministers of War who were in post long enough to produce the annual 
ministerial reports which have been analysed in this study, four of them were 
moderates (Arista, Gomez Pedraza, Herrera, Parres), three of them were 
traditionalists (Almonte, Facio, Robles) and two of them were santanistas 
(Garcia Conde, Tornel). It is significant that none of them were radical liberals. 
Furthermore, a glance at Stevens's definition of the political allegiances of 
individual high ranking officers who were cabinet ministers and presidents 
between 1824 and 1867 shows that the majority of influential high ranking 
officers were either traditionalists/conservatives or moderates/santanistas.170 
The notable exceptions are generals Vicente Guerrero and Juan Alvarez,171 both 
originating from the present state of Guerrero. 
Although further research needs to be carried out into the individuals who 
made up the officer corps of independent Mexico, in order to arrive at a more 
complete definition of the ideology of the regular army, the statistics regarding 
those generals who took an active part in the political arena of the capital 
suggest that the regular army was, in essence, a traditionalist-santanista force 
which did not favour the more radical reforms that civilian liberals such as 
Valentin Gomez Farias had in mind for Mexico. The views which were 
expressed by the Ministers of War during this period on society, on what the 
main goals of a worthy government consisted of and the lives they led, clearly 
illustrate this point. 
170 Stevens, Origins of Instability, pp. 120 -7. 
171 However, according to Brian Hamnett, even Juan Alvarez's 'radicalism' is 
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Gomez Pedraza (1789-1851), fought against the insurgents during the war of 
independence at the head of the 'faithful of Potosi' and even contributed to the 
capture of Morelos.172 Although he became one of the yorkino leaders during 
the 1820s after the fall of Iturbide, his credentials as a moderate were clearly 
significant in that the radicals overthrew him by force and replaced him with 
Guerrero when he won the elections in 1828. Moreover, although he invited the 
more radical federalists Gomez Farias and Francisco Garcia to be part of his 
ministerial cabinet when he was returned to the presidential seat by Santa Anna 
in 1833,173 he went on to serve as Minister of Relations under the traditionalist 
Bustamante regime in 1838, and under Santa Anna in 1841. In fact by the 1840s 
Gomez Farias had arrived at the conclusion that Gomez Pedraza was filled with 
pride, false, ungrateful and someone who thought he was entitled to 
everything.174 Essentially, although Gomez Pedraza represented the moderate 
wing of the liberal faction at different stages in his career he was more inclined 
to support a government which favoured the interests of the privileged classes, 
church and army, than one which stood for 'pure' liberalism. As Costeloe points 
out, Gomez Pedraza 'joined with conservatives in defence of order, property 
and privilege'.175 Like the conservatives, he was convinced in 1849 that the 
main mistake they had made in the 1820s had been to impose a representative 
system for which the people of Mexico were not ready. Mexico needed to be 
directed by an enlightened minority until it acquired the political maturity 
required for it to feature alongside modern democratic nations such as the 
United States.176 
Jose Joaquin de Herrera (1794-1854) was another moderate who actively 
fought against the insurgents during the war of independence. Although he was 
Minister of War during the Liberal experiment of 1833-34 he did not 
immediately resign when Santa Anna brought the Gomez Farias administration 
to an end, and went on to take the respectable post of Inspector General of the 
Army under the santanistas and under Bustamante from August 1834 to 
December 1837. As has been noted, he advocated a programme of moderate 
reform during his Presidency in 1845. However, he was considered by liberals 
such as Gomez Farias as a centralist and a traitor. In fact, the liberals conspired 
to overthrow Herrera because they feared he had monarchist inclinations.177 In 
the plan they drew up in May 1845 they argued that Herrera's government was 
suffocating the desires of the people for the re-establishment of the constitution 
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of 1824, and that it was entering into 'furtive and treacherous negotiations' with 
the rebellious Texans.178 
Joaquin Parres (1793-1848) also fought in the Royalist forces during the war 
of independence. Having been under the orders of the Spanish general Pedro 
Celestino Negrete he went on to embrace Iturbide's Plan of Iguala in 1821 and 
participated in the entrance into Mexico City of the Army of the Three 
Guarantees on 27 September. He was among those constitutionalist liberals and 
reactionary traditionalists who conspired against Iturbide after he proclaimed 
himself Emperor and went on to close down Congress.179 He was responsible 
for the military intervention of 10 April 1827 which brought an end to the 
violent confrontation which had escalated in Durango between the radical 
chirrines and the traditionalist forces of one Gonzalez over the expulsion of 
Spaniards,180 and went on to advocate moderate policies as Governor of Jalisco, 
and later Deputy for Guanajuato. However, it is clear that he was perceived to 
be a santanista by the mid-1830s as he came close to being elected interim 
president following Barragan's death in 1837 whilst Santa Anna was away.181 It 
must also be noted that he was, regarding the role of the army, a devout 
defender of its privileged status. Significantly, his defence of military values 
was such that in 1846 Paredes y Arrillaga invited him to act as Minister of the 
Exchequer in his reactionary regime.182 Whilst not displaying any clearly 
consistent political convictions in Congress, he nevertheless expressed a certain 
element of militaristic fanaticism by actually arguing that the army's behaviour 
during the turmoils of 1828-33 had been exemplary. It had obeyed its orders 
and fought with valour: 'Where else can you find soldiers like these? Mexicans 
can be proud of having an army which has suffered terrible losses [because](...) 
of its valour and enthusiasm'.183 
Almonte (1803-69), younger than Gomez Pedraza, Herrera and Parres, was 
only seven years old when the war of independence broke out. He accompanied 
his father Morelos during the first years of the revolution. However, at the age 
of twelve he was sent to the United States, where he became a student in New 
Orleans, not returning to Mexico until Iturbide had been crowned Emperor. 
Although he was a federalist in the 1820s, the Texan campaign of 1836, in 
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which he was involved and in fact made prisoner, converted him into a 
dedicated centralist. A friend of Santa Anna's, with whom he shared the 
adventure of El Alamo and the misadventure of San Jacinto, he also saw party 
politics as one of the main causes for Mexico's civil strife and misfortunes. To 
achieve unity it was fundamental to encourage a proper sense of nationalism; a 
centralist national movement devoid of 'politics' with patriotism representing 
the main 'conservative principle of society'. Thus, advocating the 'antipolitics' 
of santanismo, Almonte stressed, as Minister of War, that the 'spirit of 
independence' needed to be regained.184 Almonte, in fact, went on to join the 
Conservative Party in 1850, supported the Conservative-santanista alliance of 
1853, and went on to fight for the conservatives in the War of the Reforma. 
As is well known, Arista (1802-55) despised the radical wing of the liberal 
faction. In a letter to Herrera on 24 August 1845 he proclaimed that it was his 
main objective 'to stifle any attempt at sanscullotism'.185 Although his enemies 
accused him of being a 'socialist' when he became president in 1851, he denied 
such accusations and further argued that he was a Roman Catholic who 
recognised the authority of the Church.186 Although he was only a year older 
than Almonte, he became a cadet in the Royalist forces of Puebla at the age of 
15. His traditionalist militarism in 1832 meant that he fought for Bustamante's 
administration against Santa Anna and was subsequently exiled in 1833. 
However, once Santa Anna brought the Gomez Farias liberal administration to 
an end in 1834, Arista returned supporting the ideals upheld in the Plan of 
Cuernavaca. Although Arista did not advocate obvious traditionalist values he 
did embrace the nationalist sentiments and rhetoric which characterised the 
santanistas. His passion for Mexico was such that after he died in exile, off the 
shores of Portugal on his way to France in 1855, his heart was transported back 
to Mexico where it was buried.187 
Facio (1790-1836) was an extreme reactionary educated in Ferdinand VII's 
Guardia Real in Spain. He was actively involved in Bravo's escoces revolt of 
1827 and has been generally portrayed as the individual who was responsible 
for issuing the order of Guerrero's execution in 1831.188 He was committed to 
Alaman's administration of 1830-32 and believed in restoring the values of the 
colonial era.189 His extremism was such that the atypical traditionalist Carlos 
184 Almonte, Memoria... 1846, p. 9. 
185 Quoted in Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 278. 
186 Moises Gonzalez Navarro, Anatomia del poder en Mexico 1848-1853 (Mexico, 
1977), p. 94. 
187 Diccionario Porrua de Historia. 
188 He was formally accused of murdering Guerrero after the fall of Bustamante on 6 
April 1833. 
189 See Facio, Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio, y sobre la 
causa intentada contra los cuatro ministros del Vice-Presidente D. Anastasio 
Bustamante, presenta Jose Antonio Facio (Paris, 1835). 
Maria de Bustamante, in August 1831, accused him of being responsible for the 
repressive nature of the regime.190 His committed dedication to improving the 
state of the army, above all other considerations, has already been noted. 
Likewise he advocated strengthening the separate privileges of the regular 
army. As he stated in his ministerial report of 1830, 'prestige has always been 
the fundamental foundation upon which all good order and military discipline 
are based upon'.191 
For Robles (1817-62) the most important desire of the people was to be safe and 
protected. It was the government's duty to provide this security and to ensure 
that there was law and order. Once this was achieved the progress and 
prosperity of the nation could be encouraged. Evidently, as was perceived by 
the traditionalists, the importance of discipline and authority in such a society, 
this 'foundation of the greatness and power of nations', depended entirely on 
the existence of a strong regular army. For Robles the army remained the most 
important institution of the republic.192 Unlike the afore-mentioned ministers, 
however, Robles was of a different generation; one, which in fact did not 
actively participate or even remember the war of independence. He belonged to 
a military generation whose political formation developed precisely at a time 
when the privileges of the army were considered unviolable by the different 
Ministers of War whilst liberal civilian politicians attempted to curtail them. He 
was, in this sense, of a similar generation to colonels Luis Osollo and Miguel 
Miramon, who moved into revolt in 1858 precisely to reassert military 
predominance. As David Brading has pointed out, it cost 'the liberals three 
years of bitter civil war to destroy the last remnants of an institution which since 
the days of Calleja had embodied national sovereignty'.193 Robles advocated 
strong conservative, but above all militaristic principles, and actively fought 
against the Liberals in the War of the Reforma. Captured by General Ignacio 
Zaragoza on his way to assist Almonte in supporting the French intervention of 
1862, he was executed in San Andres Chalchicomula. 
Garcia Conde (1806-51) was another minister who openly advocated a 
political standpoint which condemned party politics. In his mind the revolt of 6 
December 1844 was successful because 'political beliefs had been put aside'. 
The country needed a 'national movement' and it was the army which could 
provide this. Whilst the parties had contaminated society with 'political 
fanaticism', the army intervened to rescue the nation. Like Robles he stressed 
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that the army was the most 'indispensable social element' of society.194 Like 
Arista he became a cadet in the Royalist forces in 1817, and, typically, joined 
the Plan of Iguala in 1821. He displayed his committed centralist militarism 
fighting for the Bustamante regime in 1832, in the Battles of El Gallinero and in 
the siege of San Luis Potosi. Like Arista, once Santa Anna ended the liberal 
administration of 1833-34, Garcia Conde became a loyal santanista, 
accompanying Santa Anna in the offensive against Governor Francisco Garcia's 
federalist rebellion of Zacatecas of 1835. Similarly, he led the cadets who 
defended the government during Urrea and Gomez Farias's federalist revolt of 
July 1840. He supported the santanista Bases de Tacubaya of 1841, 
representing the province of Sonora, and he shared Tornel's santanista 
reformist concern for education, acting as a teacher in the Corps of Engineers 
(1828-31), and as Director of the Colegio de Mineria (1837-43). 
Clearly, just by considering the beliefs and political behaviour of those 
Ministers of War who were in office long enough to produce the corresponding 
annual reports, certain patterns start to emerge. These patterns are not dispelled 
if those other high ranking officers who acted as Ministers of War between 
1822-52, but who did not publish their reports, are taken into account. The 
following ministers were traditionalists/conservatives: Antonio Medina, Manuel 
de la Sosa Riva, Francisco Arrillaga, Jose Ignacio Garcia Yllueca, Jose Castro, 
Manuel Rincon, Cirilo Gomez Anaya, Francisco Gomez Parada, Miguel 
Barragan, Ignacio de Mora y Villamil, Ignacio del Corral, Mariano Paredes y 
Arrillaga, Joaquin Velazquez de Leon, Lino Jose Alcorta and Santiago Blanco. 
The following ministers were moderates: Manuel de Mier y Teran, Jose Ignacio 
Esteva, Francisco Moctezuma, Mariano Michelena, Jose Moran, Isidro Reyes, 
Pedro Maria Anaya, Manuel Maria Sandoval, Ignacio Gutierrez and Luis de la 
Rosa. The following ministers were santanistas: Ignacio Maria de la Barrera, 
Jose Maria Diaz Noriega, Ignacio Basadre, Valentin Canalizo, Antonio 
Vizcaino, Luis de Ormaechea and Juan Suarez Navarro. Only Vicente Guerrero, 
Juan Pablo Anaya and Benito Quijano were radicals. In other words, including 
those ministers which have been looked at in detail, of a total of 44 high-
ranking officers who served as Ministers of War between 1822 and 1853, 18 
were traditionalists/conservatives, 14 were moderates, nine were santanistas 
and three were radicals. Having said this, the mentioned radicals were not 
Ministers of War for longer than a couple of weeks, and, in contrast, it was the 
santanistas who held office for a longer period of time. Moreover, of these 44 
high-ranking officers, with the exceptions of Vicente Guerrero, Jose Maria 
Tornel, Manuel Rincon, and, theoretically speaking, Juan Nepomuceno 
Almonte, the rest of those who were old enough to fight in the war of 
independence invariably fought in the Royalist Army of New Spain. A glance at 
a list of Division and Brigade Generals at the end of 1840 further confirms that 
out of a total of 39 generals, 29 of them had fought against the insurgent forces 
194 Garcia Conde, Memoria... 1845, pp. ii and 15-6. 
before the pronouncement of the Plan of Iguala.195 
There is no doubt that the common experience of the war of independence, 
especially for a majority of high ranking officers who had fought for the colony, 
was a determining factor in creating a sense of corporateness in the regular 
army. Moreover, the sense of their social and political importance was further 
enhanced by the fact that it was they who achieved independence with the Plan 
of Iguala and not the insurgents. This importance was certainly celebrated in all 
of the Memorias de Guerra, and legally consolidated with the survival of the 
fuero militar. It is evident that the great majority of high ranking officers, 
regardless of certain apparent individual political differences, believed that they 
formed part of a separate privileged institution. As Brading has pointed out, 'the 
Mexican army constituted an autonomous power structure, not merely parallel 
with but often superior to the civil authority'.196 It is also evident that the 
defence of their estate and privileges was a main priority. Thus whenever their 
privileges were under threat, as was the case in 1833-1834, all party divisions 
were put aside and a united front became apparent. Generals Anastasio 
Bustamante and Santa Anna were clearly the most popular presidents of the 
period among the high ranking officers because they insisted on upholding the 
interests of the army as a fundamental priority. If high ranking officers 
eventually revolted against them at different turning-points in this period, it was 
in most cases because they were unable to find sufficient funds to continue to 
provide the military elite with the opulence they had come to expect following 
the rise of General Iturbide. 
Futhermore, as has been noted, the emphasis which was placed on creating a 
sense that the army, if anything, was a victim of the politicians' intrigues, and 
that it represented, in fact, the purest interests of the nation, remaining detached 
and above the constitutional squabbling of Congress, meant that its repeated 
interventions could be perceived as the actions of a selfless institution whose 
main role was that of arbitrating over the virulently divided factions of 
independent Mexico. Santanismo, as an early exponent of antipolitics, was 
clearly popular among the high ranking officers precisely because it offered 
them a moral justification for intervention. 
However, the militarism which came hand in hand with santanismo also 
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contained an ideological slant which meant that most of the hombres de bien 
and most of the high ranking officers who came from middle class Creole 
origins supported the repeated return to power of Santa Anna. As has been 
noted, all of the Memorias de Guerra stressed the importance of turning the 
army into a middle-class institution. High ranking officers as a class believed 
likewise that the electorate had to be restricted to property-owning citizens. It 
must also be stressed that this particular brand of militarism was also acutely 
reformist. None of the Memorias de Guerra of the period attempted to stop the 
clock or go back in time. There was a constant attempt to improve the condition 
of the soldier and, by extension, that of society at large. To claim that the 
regular army was simply a traditionalist/conservative militaristic institution 
would be misleading. The Ministers of War, whether they were traditionalists, 
moderates or santanistas shared what could be defined, for want of a better 
term, as a progressive form of conservatism; one which was deeply republican, 
and one which advocated promoting an enlightened reformism which would 
bring about the creation of a fairer system of recruitment, a far-reaching 
educational and health care programme, and a technological/industrial 
revolution, whilst allowing the army to retain the privileges it had inherited 
from the colony. 
Conclusions 
Evidently, as has been noted, the so-called 'age of Santa Anna' was a period of 
predatory praetorianism in which many officers pronounced against one 
government after another in the hope of rising to power for no other reason than 
being in power themselves. It is also clear that the economic distress of the 
army throughout most of the period motivated many officers and soldiers to 
show little loyalty to the government when a revolt began. Recent research has 
also shown that the struggles of the civilian politicians to gain power played a 
fundamental part in enhancing a praetorian tradition in the army as one faction 
after another invited the military to intervene for their cause, be it traditionalist 
or liberal. Similarly, the fact that the beliefs of different high ranking officers 
have started to be taken seriously has also demonstrated that within the army 
there was a mosaic of political opinions and allegiances which mirrored those of 
society as a whole. 
However, without necessarily contradicting any of these points, it also 
becomes clear that a certain corporateness existed among the high ranking 
officers who had emerged during the war of independence which did, in general 
terms, result in them supporting a political system which excluded the vast 
majority of the population, which relied heavily on privileges which had been 
inherited from the colonial period and which, whilst not being entirely 
autocratic, required a strong central government. The regular army in 
independent Mexico was traditionalist yet reformist in its political ideology in 
the broadest sense possible of the term, and santanista in practice. 
Furthermore, the invasion of 1846 by an army which in theory belonged to the 
ideal liberal state represented by the United States had the opposite effect of 
inevitably confirming the traditionalist beliefs of the Mexican high ranking 
officers. It comes as no surprise, with this in mind, that by 1853 conservatives 
and santanistas were working together. It is equally significant that those high 
ranking officers who had emerged during the war of independence, and who 
were still alive in 1858, invariably fought for the conservatives in the violent 
three year War of the Reforma. Generals such as Almonte even went on to 
welcome the arrival of Emperor Maximilian in 1864. The arguably liberal 
ideology which the army came to uphold under General Porfirio Diaz was 
supported by a new generation of officers whose formation was no doubt very 
different to that of those men who had fought in the war of independence. The 
officers who in their majority defended the colony at the beginning of the war 
of independence, or who otherwise accepted the indulto, and went on to support 
the Plan of Iguala in 1821, emerged in independent Mexico as a privileged 
class, whose corporate ideology was, in essence, of a reformist traditionalist-
santanista tendency. Although individual generals supported different cliques, 
Santa Anna's antipolitics allowed the regular army to detach itself from the 
party politics of the civilians, and support whoever appeared most likely to 
impose a law-abiding and ordered society in which the destiny of the country 
would be dictated by members of either the Creole elite or the military. To 
ignore the importance of the essentially traditionalist yet reformist ethos of the 
Mexican military in independent Mexico and the effect it had in preventing 
liberalism from surviving in government will only further obscure our 
understanding of this period. 
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